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FOREWORD
The story we want to tell is a bit unique. The story of
the development and flight testing of a unique aero-
space vehicle--the horizontal lander HL-10---is from
our perspective as primary members of the flight test
team at the NASA Flight Research Center (now NASA
Dryden Flight Research Center). Mr. Kempel was with
the program eight months before the first flight and
continued through the final (37th) flight. Mr. Painter's
association with the HL-10 began approximately three
years before the first flight and continued through the
final flight. Mr. Thompson flew the first lightweight
and heavyweight M2 vehicles. The first heavyweight
lifting-body flight, the M2-F2, took place on July 12,
1966, with Mr. Thompson at the controls.
Others may be more qualified to relate the story of
the birth of the HL-10; however, we have included a
section that presents some insight that may not exist
elsewhere. This section was compiled using some
unpublished notes of Robert W. Rainey and Charles L.
Ladson of NASA Langley Research Center. History
written by those who did not participate in the events
themselves may be inclined to be muted, and this may
be the case with this section. Many unnamed pilots,
engineers, technicians, mechanics, and support person-
nel made this program work. The successes of the
HL-10 were the result of efforts of the entire team, real
people. People made it work. The impressions of the
flight operations are ours and we got some help from
others who lived it too. We hope, after reading it, that
you will also think it is a story worth telling.
J
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ABSTRACT MSL mean sea level, ft
NACAThe origins of the lifting-body idea are traced back
to the mid-1950s, when the concept of a manned satel-
lite reentering the Earth's atmosphere in the form of a
wingless lifting body was first proposed. The advan-
tages of low reentry deceleration loads, range capabil-
ity, and horizontal landing of a lifting reentry vehicle
(as compared with the high deceleration loads and SAS
parachute landing of a capsule) are presented. The evo-
lution of the hypersonic HL- 10 lifting body is reviewed USAF
from the theoretical design and development process to
its selection as one of two low-speed flight vehicles for Symbols
fabrication and piloted flight testing. The design, devel- b2
opment, and flight testing of the low-speed, air-
launched, rocket-powered HL-10 was part of an CL
unprecedented NASA and contractor effort. NASA
Langley Research Center conceived and developed the D
vehicle shape and conducted numerous theoretical,
experimental, and wind-tunnel studies. NASA Flight g
Research Center (now NASA Dryden Flight Research
Center) was responsible for final low-speed (Mach h
numbers less than 2.0) aerodynamic analysis, piloted
simulation, control law development, and flight tests. L
The prime contractor, Northrop Corp., was responsible
for hardware design, fabrication, and integration. Inter- LID
esting and unusual events in the flight testing are pre-
sented with a review of significant problems en- M
countered in the first flight and how they were solved.
Impressions by the pilots who flew the HL-10 are P
included. The HL-10 completed a successful 37-flight
program, achieved the highest Mach number and alti- S
tude of this class vehicle, and contributed to the tech-
nology base used to develop the space shuttle and _Sa
future generations of lifting bodies.
_e
NASA
National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
stability augmentation system
United States Air Force
reference span squared, ft2
coefficient of lift
drag, lb
acceleration due to gravity, 32.174 ft/sec 2
altitude, ft or m
lift, lb
lift-to-drag ratio
Mach number
roll angular rate, deg/sec
reference planform area, ft2
aileron deflection, deg
elevon deflection, deg
i -!
?
_es
NOMENCLATURE
Acronyms
longitudinal stick deflection, cm
bank angle, deg
AGL
AOA
FRC
ICBM
above ground level, ft
angle of attack, deg
Flight Research Center (former name of
NASA Dryden) ......
intercontinental ballistic missile
INTRODUCTION
A significant percentage of the developed world's
population has seen the space shuttle's launch and glid-
ing retum to Earth from orbit. Before these achieve-
ments could be realized and we could experience the
thrill of a space-shuttle launch and landing, however,
significant preparation had to be accomplished. Much
k-- |
of that preparation included successfully demonstrating
unpowered landings by a new class of vehicle. This
story is about that part of the preparation--the
conception, design, development, and flight testing of a
wingless experimental aircraft. The experimental air-
craft was the HL-10, an aircraft that is referred to as a
"lifting-reentry" or "lifting-body" vehicle, and the
story is about its contribution to the development of the
terminal gliding and horizontal landing technique cur-
rently used by the space shuttle.
Lifting-Body Concept
In the early 1950s the concept of lifting reentry from
suborbital or orbital space flight evolved at the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA)* Ames Aeronautical Laboratory, Moffett
Field, California, by two imaginative engineers, H.
Julian "Harvey" Allen and Alfred Eggers. As an exam-
ple of the early work reference 1 presents a compila-
tion of papers from the last NACA Conference on
High-Speed Aerodynamics, which was held in March
1958. The initial work was accomplished in connection
with the reentry survival of ballistic missile nose cones.
Mr. Allen found that by blunting the nose of a missile,
the reentry energy would be more rapidly dissipated
through the large shock wave while a sharp nosed mis-
sile would absorb more energy, in the form of heat,
through skin friction. The blunt-nosed vehicles were
more likely to survive reentry while the pointed nosed
vehicles may suffer severe damage from heating.
Using the concept of blunt nose, Faget et al. (ref. 2)
concluded that "the state of the art is sufficiently
advanced so that it is possible to proceed confidently
with a manned satellite project based upon the ballistic
reentry type of vehicle." The same paper indicated that
the maximum deceleration loads would be on the order
of 8.5 g. Another paper from the conference (ref. 3)
presented the results of a study using a blunt 30 ° half
cone wingless reentry configuration. This configuration
resulted in high lift and high drag, which would result
in maximum deceleration loads on the order of 2 g (or
lower) and would accommodate aerodynamic controls.
In addition, this configuration would allow a lateral
reentry path deviation of about :t:230 mi and a longitu-
*NACA was the predecessor of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA).
dinai variation of about 700 mi. In the same conference
the problems with winged reentry configurations were
also discussed. Reference 4 presented an interesting
informal synopsis of the tone and ideas presented at the
conference. Less than four months after the NACA
Conference on High-Speed Aerodynamics, Congress
passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act, dis-
solving NACA and establishing NASA.
It would seem obvious that (following this confer-
ence) the logical choice for a piloted reentry configura-
tion would be the proposed, blunt half-cone--a 2-g
entry vehicle with controls and path deviation capabil-
ity, in opposition to an 8.5-g ballistic entry vehicle with
no control and almost no path deviation capability.
This was not to be, however, because of more practical
considerations. A blunt-nosed ballistic configuration
became the United States' candidate for the first
piloted spacecraft because of the lack of a large reliable
rocket capable of boosting a wingless reentry configu-
ration (ref. 4). The Atlas rocket-boosted Mercury cap-
sule later evolved into the Apollo program that used the
Saturn rocket.
The wingless reentry configuration concept had not
died though, it was just that we had no experience with
this class of vehicle. To better understand the advan-
tages of a blunt half-cone or wingless reentry vehicle
configuration concept, consider the following. Simply
stated, lifting reentry would be achieved by flying,
from space, to a conventional horizontal landing using
such vehicles as a blunt half-cone body, a wingless
body, or a vehicle with a delta planform (i.e., the space
shuttle) by taking advantage of their ability to generate
body lift and thus fly. We could not put conventional
straight or even swept wings on these vehicles as they
would burn off during reentry, although a delta plan-
form with large leading-edge radius might work. These
vehicles, or lifting bodies, would have significant glide
capability downrange (the direction of their orbital
tracks) and crossrange (the direction across their orbital
tracks) due to the aerodynamic lift (L) that they could
produce during reentry. Space capsules, on the other
hand, reenter the Earth's atmosphere on a ballistic tra-
jectory and decelerate rapidly due to their high aerody-
namic drag (D). Capsules can produce small amounts
of lift but produce large amounts of drag. Consequently
they are subjected to high reentry forces due to rapid
deceleration and have little or no maneuvering capabil-
ity. These must then rely on parachute landings.
In contrast, the capability to produce lift (by a lifting
body) would allow the selection of several possible
landingsiteson theretumtoEarthfromorbit.In addi-
tion, the deceleration forces are significantly reduced
from about 8 g to 1 or 2 g. The solid line on figure 1
(ref. 5) represents a spacecraft's hypothetical orbital
track following a launch from NASA Kennedy Space
Center. The small triangular area, labeled Mercury/
Gemini/Apollo, off the southeast coast of the United
States, represents a typical landing "footprint" of a cap-
sule type vehicle. By contrast, the lifting-body landing
footprint, for a hypersonic (Mach (M) > 5) lift-to-drag
ratio (L/D) -- 1.5, includes the entire western United
States and parts of Mexico---a significant improvement
over a capsule. The prospect of achieving the goal of
lifting reentry was somewhat exciting when one con-
siders the limited capability of ballistic reentry cap-
sules, as illustrated in figure 1.
The footprint for the lifting body is defined by, or
dependent on, the ratio of aerodynamic L/D. Reference
6 states that lateral range during entry depends only on
the ratio of LID produced by an entering spacecraft.
This is an important ratio in the dynamics of flight for
all flight vehicles (birds too) and particularly for sail-
plane pilots. In general the higher the LID the farther
the vehicle will be able to glide.
Lift is that ability (it is really a force) of a wing or
thin plane surface to overcome gravity by producing an
opposite force as air moves over it when the leading
edge is tilted slightly up. This force is generated by the
moving air (molecules) coming in contact with or
under the influence of the wing or surface and produc-
ing a higher pressure on one side. More specifically,
the lower surface generally experiences higher than
ambient pressure while the upper surface experiences
significantly lower than ambient pressure. We usually
associate this force with a wing although almost any
type of surface, an umbrella for ex_'nple, can produce
lift (air has to be moving over or by it though). A wing,
or airfoil as we call them, produces lift more efficiently,
by virtue of its shape, rather than just some flat surface
shape. As a demonstration of lift, put your hand out the
window of a moving automobile, fingers pointing at
90 ° from the road, index finger forward and fingers
close together with palm down. Slowly rotate your
wrist so that the little finger is lower than the index fin-
ger. Feel the tendency of your hand to rise. That is lift.
Drag is the force that resists the morion or that force
that tends to bend your hand toward the back of the car.
Rotate your palm so it is perpendicular to the ground
and feel maximum drag (zero lift but lots of drag). The
medium in which we are immersed is air, but the same
characteristic happens in other fluids too.
The ratio of LID is very important to an airplane,
particularly one without power. This ratio is a direct
measurement of how far a glider, sailplane, or airplane
without power can glide. The higher the number the
farther the glide can be. Everybody wants to reduce
drag. Airline owners benefit from reduced drag by get-
ring more miles per gallon. Sailplanes pilots want to
h/crease lift and reduce drag so they can fly farther.
Sailplanes with L/D of 20 and above are not uncom-
mon, and values of about 60 have been recorded. This
means that, if LID = 20 at a given airspeed, for every
20 ft forward the sailplane moves, it will sink 1 ft for a
glide ratio of 20 to 1 and have a glide angle less than 3 °
-7/e
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Figure 1. Orbital reentry footprints.
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nosedown.Whenwetalkof lifting bodies,wearetalk-
ingof vehicleswithsubsonicL/D -_3 or 4 at most.
Even though the concept of lifting reentry is rela-
tively simple, the practicality of achievement was not.
The salient question concerning lifting-body opera-
tions was how to land these vehicles. The initial
answer, of course, was with power (except in an emer-
gency). And in the event of an emergency, the next
question was whether a pilot could successfully flare
and land this class vehicle with no power.
Brief Area Description and Some History
In late 1946 NACA sent a small contingent of 13
engineers and technicians from Langley Memorial
Aeronautical Laboratory to the Muroc Army Air Field
to assist in flight testing the Army's XS-1 rocket-
powered airplane. This small group was known as the
NACA Muroc Flight Test Unit. Muroc Army Air Field,
with the adjacent Muroc (Dry) Lake (now knownas
Rogers (Dry) Lake) and the home of Edwards Air
Force Base, is where all HL-10 flight testing took
place. (This group of people has grown into what is
today the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center with
more than 1100 people in support of premiere flight
test activities.) Rogers Lake is located on the western
edge of California's Mojave Desert, just south of High-
way 58 between the towns of Boron and Mojave. It is a
few miles southwest of the world's largest open-pit
Borax mine and within sight of one of the first emigrant
trails to California.
Muroc Army Air Field was named after the founding
family of the area. The Corum family, who settled near
the large dry lakebed in 1910, wanted a post office with
their family name, but there was already one by that
name in California. So they reversed the spelling of
their name to Muroc.
This geographical area was a logical choice for
flight testing. The fiat, hard surface of Rogers Lake, at
approximately 2300 ft above sea level, makes one of
nature's best landing sites on the planet. The arid
_.ather also makes for excellent flying conditions
_ost every day of the year. The lakebed area is
ximately 64 mi 2, or three times the size of Man-
Island. ,
-__ Rogers Lake is the sediment-filled remnant of an
ancient lake formed eons ago. Today, when it rains,
: several inches of water can accumulate on the lake, and
in combination with the winds, a natural smoothing
and leveling action takes place. When the water dries, a
smooth level surface results, one better than man could
produce. Lake water also brings to life an abundance of
small shrimp, several unique species of prehistoric
crustacean, prevalent only when wet, in many of the
desert's lakebeds. Annual mean rainfall here is approx-
imately 4-5 in., sometimes considerably less; in
extremely wet years rainfall can be 6-9 in. or occasion-
ally more than 15 in. Winds are usually predictable,
from the southwest (240 °) in spring and summer with a
mean velocity of 6-9 knots. Sunrises and sunsets can
be breathtakingly beautiful. If the rains are the right
amount at the right time, the spring flowers are nothing
less than spectacular. Actually, it is not a bad place to
work and live.
The surrounding geography consists of typical Cali-
fornia high desert rolling sand hills with some rocky
rises, ridges, and outcroppings punctuated with dry
lakebeds in the low spots. Mountains abound to the
south and west and to the north the mighty Sierra
Nevadas rise over 14,000 ft. Joshua trees abound
among the chaparral and sagebrush and are quite dra-
matic. In some ways these trees are grotesque, but in
other ways they are beautiful. The Joshua tree is a type
of yucca (a member of the lily family) with clusters of
very sharp bayonet-like or quill-like dark green, very
sharp protrusions that are 6-10 in. long, which bota-
nists call "leaves." These trees, like everything else in
the desert, are well-suited for survival in the harsh cli-
mate. Extreme temperatures here reach from near 0 °F
in the winter to 120 °F in the summer, with 10-15 per-
cent humidity. Every living thing here is uniquely
adapted for desert survival.
In the spring of 1843 Joseph B. Chiles, starting from
Independence, Missouri, organized and led one of the
first wagon trains to California. At Fort Laramie he met
an old friend, Joe Walker, who joined the procession to
California as a guide and companion. Running low on
provisions, the wagon train split; Chiles and a group on
horseback went north to circumvent the Sierra Moun-
tains, while Walker led the wagons south. The Walker
party arrived at (what was to be named) Walker Pass at
11:00 am on December 3, 1843 after abandoning their
wagons just north of Owens Lake a short time earlier
(ref. 7). Walker Pass, across the southern Sierra, is
approximately 56 mi from current day Edwards AFB
where another Joe Walker, prominent NACA/NASA
X-15 test pilot would engage in a different kind of pio-
neering a little over 100 years later (refs. 8, 9, and 10).
-x
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Early aviators, airplane designers like John
Northrop, and the military discovered the dry lake in
the 1930s and used it as a place to test new designs and
to rendezvous. During World War II the U.S. Army Air
Corps conducted extensive training and flight testing in
the area. In 1942 the Air Corps shipped their first turbo-
jet-powered aircraft (the Bell XP-59A) to Muroc for
flight testing. This airplane was fitted with a pseudo
propeller made of wood, fitted on the nose so that curi-
ous eyes would not question or talk much about this
new arrival. On October 2, 1942 the XP-59A airplane
made the first turbojet flight in the United States with
Bell test pilot Robert Stanley at the controls (ref. 11).
This was also the location of a colorful social club and
riding stable established by the famous aviatrix Flo-
rence "Pancho" Barnes (ref. 12), which was frequented
by many early famous test pilots and aviation notables.
In more recent years the USAF, NASA, and various
contractors have conducted flight tests on exotic and
unusual aerospace vehicles in this location.
GETTING STARTED
In the words of Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, the purpose of
full-scale flight research "is to separate the real from
the imagined.., to make known the overlooked and the
unexpected." These words give substance as to why a
small segment of innovative NASA engineers and
technicians live and work here in the western Mojave
desert.
In the autumn of 1959, the NASA Flight Research
Center (FRC) (which in May 1976 became the Hugh L.
Dryden Flight Research Center) was assigned the task
of conducting all of NASA's high-speed flight research.
We were accustomed to conducting high-performance
flight test and were accustomed to rocket-powered
vehicles, which were required to land unpowered. With
the vast expanse of Rogers Lake, unpowered landings
with high-performance aircraft became relatively rou-
tine-but not risk free. Techniques were developed,
however, and lessons were leamed, sometimes the
painful way. Through the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s,
programs such as the rocket-powered XS-1, X-1A,
X-1B, X-1E, and X-15 were all tested here. In addition,
in the 1950s high-performance turbojet aircraft such as
X-3, X-4, X-5, XF-92A, and D-558-I were tested here.
Reference 10 details early flight test activities.
We were well-prepared for accomplishing the
lifting-body programs insofar as unpowered (dead
stick) landing techniques were concemed. The HL-10
was not the first lifting body tested at the FRC. The first
lifting body tested, in the spring of 1963, was the
Ames-Dryden M2-F1, a blunt half-cone configuration
(ref. 13). Lifting bodies were envisioned to be a new
manned research program by R. Dale Reed, an innova-
tive FRC engineer and private pilot. Mr. Reed reviewed
the plan for the Apollo mission to the Moon and return
to Earth. Mr. Reed found that the plan called for a bal-
listic reentry capsule and that the program planners
thought that a lifting reentry vehicle configuration was
still too risky, even though the Saturn booster by this
time provided sufficient thrust and reliability. Mr. Reed
felt that if a lifting body could demonstrate a horizontal
landing, it would build confidence within all of NASA
that this class of vehicle could be employed to great
advantage. Mr. Reed had been interested in the work
being done at NASA Ames with the M2 lifting body
under Mr. Eggers. Mr. Reed then contacted Mr. Eggers,
who at that time was Ames Deputy Director, and pro-
posed the idea of building a large scale piloted demon-
strator lifting-body vehicle. Mr. Eggers thought that
Mr. Reed had a good idea and told him to pursue it fur-
ther.
Mr. Reed had been an avid modeler since childhood
and, as a NASA engineer, frequently used model air-
planes to evaluate his ideas. The question that naturally
came to Mr. Reed and others was: Could such a wing-
less vehicle be controlled and landed by a pilot? With
Mr. Eggers' encouragement, Mr. Reed proceeded on
his own to build a small free-flight M2 model that was
towed aloft by a large radio-controlled model and
released. The M2 model was so inherently stable that
these flights were truly impressive. Mr. Reed's wife
took some 8-mm home movies of successful glide
flights and landings. Mr. Reed next approached Milton
O. "Milt" Thompson, an FRC X-15 test pilot, and got
him interested (ref. 14). Mr. Thompson indicated that
he would be willing to "fly" the unusual configuration
if wind-tunnel tests validated the desigrv--even though
it had the gliding characteristics of a well-polished
brick. Mr. Reed and Mr. Thompson, armed with the
home movies and other presentation material, briefed
Mr. Eggers and Paul E Bikle, director of the FRC. With
Mr. Thompson's assurance that he was a proponent,
Mr. Bikle and Mr. Eggers bought the idea on the spot.
Mr. Reed and others initiated a full-scale design
employing a tubular steel primary structure around
whichseveralplywoodshapescould.beattached.The
original idea was to build a full-scalewind-tunnel
model,suitablefor mannedflight if thepreliminary
NASAAmes40 x 80 ft wind-tunneltestswarranted.
Mr. Eggerspromisedto giveFROall thewind-tunnel
supportneeded.
Onewouldthinkthat,in aprogressiveorganization
suchasNASA, innovativeideassuchas a manned
lifting-bodyprogramwouldbemet withenthusiasm.
ThiswasnotentirelysoatFRCor withinNASAwith
someof themoreconservativengineersandscientists.
Thiswouldbeahigh-riskventure,andthereweresome
real skeptics.Somefelt that a lifting-bodyprogram
wouldbetoohighariskandflyingwithoutwingswas
impractical.EventheFRCresearchdirector,"Tommy"
Toll, a conservativeandhighly respectedresearcher,
wasopposedto flyingtheM2.Mr.Toll feltthattherisk
of flyingwastoohighandthatanyresearchshouldbe
limitedto wind-tunnelstudies.Mr.Reedwasneverone
to be discouraged,though.Oncehe focusedon the
idea,hedevelopedakindof tunnelvisionandbecame
almostobsessed.FrequentlyMr. ReedwouldbeSeen
glidingM2 modelsupanddownthecorridorsonlyto
bemetwith ridiculefrom fellowengineers.(Wesus-
pectthattheWrightbrothersuffered,onoccasion,the
samedisdain.)OnceMr.Thompson,Mr.Bikle,andMr.
Eggersweresoldon theidea,theactualaunchingof a
newprogramwithinNASAwasthenextmajorobsta-
cle.Toaccomplishthisobjective,thenextphaseof the
lifting-bodyprogramwasinitiated.
With amodestbudgetfromMr. Bikle's discretion-
ary fundandsomededicatedvolunteerhelp,a small
teamheadedby Mr. Reedwasestablished.This team
enlistedtheaidof GusBriegleb,a well-knownglider
builderandoperatorof thenearbyE1Miragedry lake
gliderport.Assistedby Mr. BrieglebandtheNASA
volunteers,theteamlaunchedthedesignandconstruc-
tionof whatwasto betheM2-F1.TheM2 wasbasi-
caUya 13° blunthalf-cone,flat on top androundon
bottom.Whatresultedwasa ratherunusualcreation
thatwasnicknamed"the flyingbathtub"by areporter
whosawthevehiclewhenit wascompleted.Thevehi-
cleconsistedof a steeItubeprimarystructurecovered
withplywood,cockpitwithminimalinstruments,con-
trolsurfaces,andlandinggear(fig.2).Thisvehiclewas
plannedto beunpoweredfromtheoutset,andit was
only laterin theprogramthata smalllandingrocket
wasadded.Initially theM2-F1wastowedbehinda
highlymodifiedconvertibleautomobilewith a racing
engine.Aftertheinitial successes,NASA'sR4D(Navy
Figure2. M2-F1in flight.
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versionof the C-47)towedthevehicleto altitudeto
accomplishlongerglide flights. The entire M2-F1
programwas accomplishedfor under$30,000,an
unheardof sumevenin thosedays.Wecanonlyguess
whatthegovernmentauditorsmusthavethoughtwhen
they discoveredNASA's purchaseof a convertible
automobile.Reference15presentsanexcellentreview
of the overall lifting-body programsat FRC. The
M2-FI programwassuccessfullycompletedinAugust
1964.
Mr. Reednowpromotedtheideaof aheavyweight
M2 lifting-bodyprogramthat would air-launchthe
vehiclebymodifyingtheexistingadapterfor theB-52.
HealsofavoredusingtheXLR-11rocketenginesleft
fromtheX-I, D-558-II,andX-15programs.TheX-15
hadupgradedto the XLR-99rocketengineandno
longerrequiredthesmallerockets.
Withtheinitial successesof theM2-F1program,a
groupfromFRC(Mr. Bikle,Mr. Thompson,andMr.
Reed)plannedatrip to NASAHeadquarterswith their
presentationmaterial.Thisgrouporiginallyproposeda
follow-onprogramthatcalledfor designingandcon-
structingtwo heavyweightaluminumM2 vehicles.It
wasproposedthatoneof thevehiclesbe reservedasa
backup.Thisproposalcalledfor thevehicleto becar-
fledaloftandlaunchedbytheNASAB-52.ThisB-52
had been structurallymodifiedand configuredto
launch the joint NASA/USAF X-15 hypersonic
researchaircraft. While at headquarters,it was
proposedto the FRCpeoplethat NASA Langley's
HL-10 be includedin a flight testprogramas the
second-candidateconfiguration.TheFRCgroupagreed
andasaresult,NASAHeadquartersapprovedthepro-
gramandfundingfor theconstructionof twoheavy-
weightvehicles--theAmesM2-F2 andthe Langley
HL-10.
CONFIGURING THE HL-10
Concept and Early Configuration
In addition to the lifting reentry work at the NACA
Ames Aeronautical Laboratory in the mid-1950s, engi-
neers and scientists at the NACA Langley Memorial
Aeronautical Laboratory, Hampton, Virginia, were also
considering this concept. Many hypersonic studies
were conducted to evaluate various candidate aerody-
namic shapes within the Langley Aerophysics Divi-
sion. Their specified preliminary goals in the design
and development of such a vehicle included minimiza-
tion of refurbishment (time and money), fixed geome-
try, low deceleration loads (from orbital speeds), low
heating rates, the ability of roll and pitch modulation,
and horizontal powered landing.
The Langley studies indicated that a reentry vehicle
with negative camber and a flat bottom, rather than a
blunt half-cone, might provide higher trimmed lift-to-
drag ratios over the angle-of-attack (AOA) range. In
their theoretical and trade-off studies and wind-tunnel
experiments this negative-camber concept was used in
1957 to develop a configuration stable about its three
axes. A flat lower lifting surface was retained for better
hypersonic lifting capability. This vehicle was first
referred to as a manned lifting reentry vehicle. A vehi-
cle with the combination of a nose tilted up at 20 °, an
aerodynamic flap, and a flat bottom, was found to be
stable about the pitch, roll, and yaw axes and to trim at
angles of attack up to approximately 52 ° at a lift coeffi-
cient in excess of 0.6. This vehicle configuration, now
referred to as a lifting body, also would result in the
retention of higher trimmed lift-to-drag ratios over
lower angles of attack as compared with a vehicle with
zero nose tilt. The advantage of lifting bodies over cap-
sules was their relatively high-lift-to-high-drag ratio
characteristics as compared with zero lift to high drag.
In addition, lifting bodies could achieve the specified
goals by their maneuverability during orbital reentry
and in the terminal landing flight phase similar to
conventional airplanes. The ability of lifting bodies to
control both roll and pitch axes (to control the direction
and magnitude of the lift vector and hence the flight-
path) was felt to be a great advantage. This control was
to be achieved using either reaction jets or aerody-
namic control surfaces, or both.
NASA Langley's John Becker had also presented a
paper on winged configurations (ref. 16) at the 1958
NACA Conference on High-Speed Aerodynamics. In
this paper Mr. Becker concluded with the analysis of a
small, winged satellite configuration embodying all of
the desirable features identified by Langley earlier--a
low /riD for range contrrl, hypersonic maneuvering,
and the capability for conventional glide-landing; a
flat-bottomed wing with a large leading-edge radius;
and a fuselage crossing the protected lee area atop the
wing. This configuration would not, however, be
selected to carry the first United States astronaut into
space. As reference 4 points out, what "ruled out accep-
:tance of his [Mr. Becket's] proposal, however, was the
fact that the Atlas, the only ICBM anywhere [in the
United States] near ready for use in 1958, did not have
sufficient boost capability." This did not, however,
deter the Langley researchers from developing con-
cepts and design goals for a winged satellite.
In the early 1960s, two independent surveys con-
ducted within the Astrophysics Division at Langley
revealed that there were no studies underway to
develop a configuration that would meet the prelimi-
nary mission goals. Continuing studies validated that
entry vehicles with hypersonic L/D -- 1 could provide
numerous attractive characteristics. If this L/D could be
provided without elevon deflections in the maximum
heating portion of the trajectory, local heating problems
near the elevons could be avoided. High trimmed lift
coefficient would provide high-altitude-lift modulation.
For horizontal runway landings without power (an
emergency situation), a subsonic trimmed LID of at
least 4 was desired. The body should provide good vol-
umetric distribution for multiperson application and
acceptable heating rates and loads throughout the speed
regime, possibly including superorbital speeds. Stabil-
ity and control over the speed range and launch vehicle
compatibility were also essential. Based on these stud-
ies, the refined and established mission vehicle goals
were stated in 1962, as the following:
1. Hypersonic lift-to-drag ratio of approximately
1 (without elevon deflection)
2. Hightrimmedlift athypersonicspeeds
3. Subsoniclift-m-drag ratio of approximately 4
4. High volumetric efficiency, 12-person capabil-
ity
5. Acceptable body shape at all speeds
6. Static stability and controUibUity at all speeds
7. Launch vehicle compatibility
The low reentry deceleration loads, about 2 g,
imposed on a vehicle of this type was an inherent char-
acteristic and an implied goal. By comparison a
capsule would be subjected to about 8-g reentry decel-
eration loads.
Refinements were now made to the evolving config-
urations in an effort to meet the mission goals by con-
ducting tradeoff studies interrelating sweep, thickness
ratio, leading-edge radius, and location of maximum
thickness. In 1962 a negatively cambered lifting-body
configuration emerged and was designated the HL-10
(HL standing for horizontal lander). Camber is the
deviation of the mean line from the chord line and is
normally on the upper surface of the wing. In respect to
the HL-10, however, it was on the lower surface
instead. This vehicle entered an intermediate or study
stage of evolution at Langley involving almost every
research division. Intensive research was undertaken to
identify problems and to find solutions associated with
this type of configuration. Figure 3 is the original 1962
sketch of the HL-10. Interestingly enough the debate
on the issue of negative camber or no camber (symmet-
rical shape) continued. More detailed studies continued
on the camber issue. Finally, following more detailed
analysis, the negative-camber and symmetrical config-
urations were compared with the established mission
goals. Three additional mission considerations were
established as serious issues in the selection of camber
as follows:
8. Lower heating rates and loads comparison
9. Lower AOA for a given subsonic lift coeffi-
cient
10. Reduced subsonic flow separation
The symmetrical configuration met only 5 of the 10
mission goals while the negative-camber configuration
met 9 of the 10. The negative-camber configuration
=
Figure 4. Proposed 12-crew hypersonic configuration of the HL-10.
was the winner. The only goal the negative-camber
configuration did not meet was the lower AOA for a
given subsonic lift coefficient (#9).
The HL-10 evolved as a fiat-bottomed, fixed
geometry body with negative camber and a split trail-
ing-edge elevon capable of symmetric upward deflec-
tion that would provide the required pitch trim and
stability for hypersonic reentry and subsonic flight. The
trailing-edge elevon would also deflect differentially
for roll control. Tip fins were added for additional
directional stability. The negative camber of the lower
surface provided the longitudinal trim. The gradual
boattailing or tapering of the aft end of the upper sur-
face reduced subsonic base drag and reduced transonic
aerodynamic problems. The volumetric distribution
provided crew and subsystem installation compatible
with the center-of-gravity requirements.
Serious final vehicle configuration development and
research now began. Research areas included trajectory
analysis and entry environment, heat transfer, struc-
tures and thermal protection, aerodynamics, dynamic
stability and controllability, handling qualities, landing
methods, emergency landings on land and water,
viscous effects (including Mach number, Reynolds
number,* and vehicle length), and equipment and per-
sormel layout. A lifting-body disadvantage, however, is
that they suffer an aerodynamic heating penalty due to
their longer duration in the entry trajectory as com-
pared with a ballistic capsule. Extensive research was
conducted into methods of thermal protection. Detailed
wind-tunnel heat-transfer distributions were measured
at Mach numbers of 8 and 20 using small thin-skinned
Inconel ® models (lnconel is a registered trademark of
Huntington Alloy Products Division, International
Nickel Company, Huntington, West Virginia). The
experimental heating on the HL-10 model shape was
measured in depth.
The volumetric efficiency for the proposed HL-10
was relatively high. The volumetric efficiency is the
ratio of the useful internal volume to the total exterior
vehicle volume. The exterior vehicle volume is defined
by the volume encompassed by the external skin. A
proposed 12-person vehicle configuration of the
HL-10, shown in figure 4, has a length estimated to be
" Reynolds number. See appendix A, Glossary, for definitions of
this and other terms used in this paper.
jr --
between 25 and 30"ft with a span of 21 ft and total pres-
surized volume of 701 ft3. This view also shows the
rocket adapter module attached. In addition, it was pro-
posed that the vehicle have a full-length raised canopy
as shown in the figure. Some of the studies included
proposed large-scale vehicles that were 100 ft and
longer.
With the camber issue settled, a selection of pro-
posed fin arrangements was now required. A variety of
wind-tunnel models were constructed ranging from a
4-1/2 in. hypersonic model to a 28-ft, low-speed ver-
sion. A study was undertaken to determine the best fin
configuration. The hypersonic model had twin vertical
fins while the 28-ft model had a single center dorsal fin.
In attempting to identify an acceptable fin arrangement,
emphasis was placed on achieving a compromise
between subsonic trimmed performance and hyper-
sonic trim and stability. Figure 5 shows some of the
arrangements tested. (Lower outboard, dorsals, and
single-, twin-, and triple-fin arrangements were investi-
gated along with various modifications to the aft end of
the vehicle body.) Ten designs were included in the
various wind-tunnel studies. A basic triple-fin configu-
ration was selected as the best compromise and is
shown in the upper right portion of figure 5. Analyses
and wind-tunnel tests were then focused on this basic
configuration.
Final Configuration
With NASA Headquarters' approval for a heavy-
weight lifting-body program, NASA FRC compiled the
requirements and specifications for the two lifting-
body vehicles. As it turned out, Mr. Reed's last major
contributions to the lifting-body program were devel-
oping the statement of work for the heavyweight
M2-F2 and HL-10, and leading the source evaluation
board to select the winning proposal. With the state-
ment of work completed, four airframe manufacturers
responded with proposals. On April 13, 1964 the
Norair Division of the Northrop Corp. of Hawthome,
Califo_a, submitted a proposal to NASA for
designing and fabricating two research lifting-body
vehicles (M2/HL-10) and was subsequently awarded
the contract.
Meanwhile wind-tunnel tests at Langley revealed
that the basic configuration trimmed subsonic L/D was
only slightly in excess of 3. This was considerably
below the established goal of 4. In addition at low
supersonic speeds and some angles of attack negative
values of directional stability resulted. To rectify this
situation and to increase subsonic L/D, an ejectable tip-
fin scheme was briefly considered. However, the ejec-
tion of tip fins during the final phase of a mission was
considered unacceptable. From wind-tunnel results, a
tip-fin configuration was developed that included
30*
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Figure 5. Variations of negatively cambered HL-10 configurations tested in NASA Langley wind tunnels.
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Figure 6. Comparison of HL-10 configurations.
changes in the tip-fin shape that resulted in increased
area, toe-in angle, and roll-out angle that provided the
required subsonic trimmed maximum I_JD. In addition,
simple two-position flaps were added to the trailing
edge of the tip fins and upper elevon to vary the base
area and, consequently, the subsonic base drag. Closing
these flaps would minimize base drag. This modifica-
tion also improved the directional stability problem.
This change was now required to be incorporated into
the design specification.
On February 3, 1965, almost 10 months following
contract award, a meeting was scheduled at FRC to
present the modified tip-fin and two-position flap pro-
posal. Several top engineers from NASA Langley,
including Eugene S. Love, Robert Rainey, and Jack
Paulson; and from NASA Headquarters, Fred
DeMerritte, Office of Advanced Research and Technol-
ogy, and chief of the lifting-body program, from whom
we received all of our funding, visited us and presented
their proposal. They wanted to add more control sur-
faces to the HL-10. These would be two-position sur-
faces and consisted of elevator flaps (located on the
upper surface of the elevon) and Outboard tip-fin flaps
(two each). This meant that a design change and modi-
fication to the existing contractual agreement was now
required. This was not a popular request with the
HL-10 program managers and engineers at FRC. The
change was made, but did not have our overwhelming
support at the time. Later in the program, however, it
was viewed as one of the best decisions made. This
modification allowed a simpler flight control design
and allowed the vehicle to fly from subsonic to super-
sonic speeds with less trim change in the pilot's control
stick position.
Figure 6 shows a side-view comparison of the basic
and final configuration. The enlarged center and tip-fin
modification on the final configuration are obvious in
this illustration. This final modification to the HL-10
configuration, based on wind-tunnel tests, improved
trim and stability characteristics in the transonic and
supersonic speed ranges and increased LID in the land-
ing approach. The two-position flap configuration con-
sisted of flaps on the upper elevon surface, split rudder,
and tip fins. Figure 7 shows details of these flap posi-
tions. In the subsonic speed regime and landing
approach the configuration was designated the sub-
sonic configuration. In this configuration the movable
upper elevon flap, rudder, and tip-fin flaps were
retracted to provide maximum boattailing (minimum
base area) on the aft portion of the vehicle. In the high
subsonic and transonic speed range where the flow on
the upper surface of the vehicle becomes sonic, the
movable flaps were deflected to minimize flow separa-
tion in the region of the control surfaces. This was
known as the transonic configuration. This was the
configuration that would also be used at all supersonic
speeds.
The design and fabrication of both lifting bodies
continued at the Norair Division of the Northrop Corp.
in Hawthorne, California. The M2-F2 was delivered on
June 15, 1965, and the HL-10 on January 18, 1966.
Figure 8 presents the HL-10 as it appeared on rollout.
The FRC tail numbers assigned to the M2-F2 and
HL-10 were 803 and 804, respectively.
I1
(a) Subsonic.
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Figure7. HL-10lifting-bodyflappositions.
ECN1061
Figure8. HL-10atrolloutatNorthropNorair.
Followingdeliveryto FRC,the nextphaseof the
lifting-bodyprogrambegan.This phaseconsistedof
installingandcheckingoutextensiveflighttestinstru-
mentation,vehicle systems,and subsystems.This
phaselastedapproximatelyone yearfor eachof the
vehiclesfollowing delivery.The first heavyweight
lifting-bodyflight,the M2-F2,took placeon July12,
1966,twoyearsfollowingcontractaward,withaglide
flight from 45,000ft with Milt Thompsonat the
controls.
The developmentof the two heavylifting bodies
wasan unprecedentedNASA andcontractoreffort.
Eachof the involvedorganizationscontributedtheir
talentsandresourcesto thefullest,whichcontributed
to thesuccessof theprogram.Theprogramwasbased
ontheideaof innovation,initiative,andaboveall, sim-
plicity wherepossible.Unneededmanagementwas
eliminated,as wereunnecessarypaperworkandred
tape.Programdecisionsweremadeat the technical
levelwithaminimumof highermanagementinterfer-
ence.Engineersand techniciansfrom FRC worked
with theircontractorcounterparts at the Northrop facil-
ity. This approach facilitated the making of important
design decisions between NASA and Northrop engi-
neers almost on the spot. This kind of team approach
resulted in the development of confidence among the
individuals involved. The result was a superior end
product with no cost overruns or significant schedule
delays. One industry representative had predicted that
these vehicles would cost as much as $15 million each
but the final cost was only $1.2 million each--an
unheard of price, even in 1965, for a new research
aircraft.
Through the years the FRC and USAF Flight Test
Center at Edwards AFB had developed close ties
through various joint research programs (ref. 10). The
Air Force had plans for their own lifting-body pro-
gram, the X-24A. Therefore, a formal joint NASA/
USAF Lifting-Body Program was established in April
1965. The X-24 would be maintained by and operated
from the FRC, just as the M2-F2 and HL-10 would be.
Piloting responsibilities for all three programs would
be shared by NASA and USAF along with various
engineering research, flight test, and simulation activi-
ties. Even though the HL-10 and M2-F2 were experi-
mental vehicles, no X identifications were assigned.
The X designation is reserved for Department of
Defense experimental aircraft only.
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FLIGHT VEHICLE DESCRIPTION
The final flight configuration (fig. 9) was a single-
place vehicle with a relatively conventional 1960s air-
craft cockpit and instrument panel (fig. 10). It was a
negatively cambered airfoil with a 74 ° sweepback delta
planforrn with three aft vertical fins. The vehicle length
was 21.17 ft; figure 11 and table 1 present all critical
dimensions and physical characteristics. Vehicle
launch weight, with propellants, was 10,009 lb and
landing weight was 6,473 lb. The center of gravity
ranged from 53.14 percent of the body length for the
launch weight configuration to 51.82 percent for the
landing condition.
Cockpit pressurization was maintained at 3.5 lb/in 2
differential for altitudes above 50,000 ft with mixed air
(nitrogen and oxygen). A pressurization schedule
maintained ambient pressure from 5,000 ft and below.
In free flight the air for cockpit pressure, defogging,
and pressure suit ventilation was stored in pressure
tanks at 3,000 lb/in 2, which was adequate for 30 rain.
Heated defog aiLwas supplied by two blowers with
integral 1,000-_r_aters. The pilots wore full pressure
suits on all rocket-ppwered missions. The pilot had
13.7 ft3 of breathing oxygen, which was sufficient for
30 rain. During captive flight the B-52 supplied most
expendables to the HL-10, so that the vehicle could be
launched with nearly maximum capacities.
Rocket power was provided to boost the vehicle to
test Mach numbers and altitudes. The rocket motor was
an upgraded off-the-shelf item that had been used on
earlier programs at FRC. The rocket motor consisted of
a four-chambered XLR-11 RM-13, which produced
2120 lb of thrust per chamber, at 265 lb/in 2 chamber
pressure. Individual chambers could be operated for
thrusi modulation to achieve the desired flight test con-
ditions. Liquid oxygen was the oxidizer and water
alcohol was the fuel. Total propellant weight was
3536 lb. The propellants were delivered to the cham-
bers by a turbopump driven by decomposed hydrogen
peroxide. Typical rocket motor burn time was about 90
to 100 sec at maximum thrust using four chambers.
. _.ooo_-
Figure 9. Right front view and left rear quarter view (inset) of HL-10 lifting-body vehicle.
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Figure 10. Instrument panel arrangement.
Note that the rocket motors were used in the early X-15
program, and at least one of the XLR-11 rocket engines
had been on loan to a museum and was retumed to the
FRC for use in the rifting-body program.
The XLR-11 rocket engine history can be traced
back to early 1946 when the Bell XS-1 airplane was
tested (ref. 10). The U. S. Navy also flew experimental
aircraft in the early 1950s using the same basic rocket
engine; however, it was designated XLR-8 (the Navy
wanted an even dash number). These rocket engines
were available and had a long history of reliability in
manned research aircraft application; so they were a
logical choice for use in the HL-10 and M2-F2/F3 pro-
grams from both reliability and economic standpoints.
In addition to the XLR-11 primary rocket engine,
two small hydrogen-peroxide landing rockets were
installed in the vehicle. These rockets could produce
500 lb of thrust each for 30 sec and were provided in
7;,
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Figure 11. Three-view drawing of HL-10.
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Table 1. Physical characteristics of HL-10 lifting body vehicle.
Body
Reference planform area, ft2
Reference length, ft
Reference span, It
Aspect ratio, b_lS
Leading edge sweep, deg
Elevons (two)
Area, each, ft2
Span, each, ft
Chord
Root, ft
Tip, fi
Elevon flap (two)
Area, each, ft2
Span, each, fl
Chord
Root, ft
Tip, ft
Vertical stabilizer
Area, each, ft 2
Span, each, ft
Chord
Root, ft
Tip, ft
Leading-edge sweep, deg
Rudders (two)
Area, each, ft 2
Span, each, ft
Chord
Outboard tip fin flaps (two)
Area, each, ft2
Span, each, ft
Chord perpendicular to hinge line, ft
Inboard tip fin flaps (two)
Area, each, f12
Span, each, ft
Chord perpendicular to hinge line, ft
Mass properties
Maximum gross weight, lb
160
21.17
13.60
1.156
74
10.72
3.58
1.93
4.06
7.50
3.58
1.58
2.63
15.80
5.02
4.32
1.97
25
4.45
4.12
1.08
3.77
4.50
0.84
2.48
3.31
0.75
10,009.3
Glide flight weight, lb
Referenced to body axes
Roll moment of inertia slug-ft 2
Maximum gross weight
Glide weight
Pitch moment of inertia, slug-ft 2
Maximum gross weight
Glide weight
Yaw moment of inertia slug-ft 2
Maximum gross weight
Glide weight
Product of inertia, slug-ft 2
Maximum gross weight
Glide weight
Center of gravity, fuselage station, in.
Maximum gross weight
Glide weight
Center of gravity, water line, in.
Maximum gross weight
Glide weight
6,473.4
1,522
1,363
6,262
5,769
7,132
6,509
555
520
135.0
131.6
4.1
5.6
case a landing approach needed to be extended. In
actuality, these rockets were never used as an aid to
landing. The only time they were used was for experi-
mentation purposes during the last phase of the
program.
The pilots required that the design specification
include speed brakes. The brakes were to provide
added drag, on demand, much like an inverse throttle
to vary the landing pattern parameters. In addition the
brakes were lightweight and required no fuel. The
HL-10 speed brake was accomplished through the use
of the split rudder. Speed brake authority was 0° to 32 °
and was pilot actuated through a cockpit switch. (The
speed-brake requirement was later specified for the
space shuttle; to the uninitiated this requirement would
seem absurd since the maximum L/D is so low on the
basic vehicle.)
Electrical power was provided by 28-V silver-zinc
battery packs. These batteries provided electrical
power to hydraulic pump motors and all other vehicle
15
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equipment and subsystems including cockpit heating
and canopy defogging. A dual hydraulic power system
controlled all primary flight control actuators at
3000 lb/in 2. Sufficient battery power was available for
approximately 40 min. Before launch electrical power
was received from the B-52 aircraft. An extendable
ram-air turbine provided hydraulic pressure, in the
event of an electrical failure, with the capability of pro-
viding approximately 50-percent control surface rate
limit.
Aerodynamic control was provided by the primary
control surfaces: elevons and rudder. Symmetric
deflection of the elevons provided pitch control, and
differential deflection provided roll control. A split rud-
der on the center vertical fin provided both yaw control
and speed brake. Pitch, roll, and yaw damping was pro-
vided through the limited authority stability augmenta-
tion system (SAS) to the elevons and rudder. Trim was
provided by the elevons for pitch and roll and by the
rudder for yaw or directional trim.
The primary control surfaces were actuated by irre-
versible hydraulic power actuators. These actuators
accepted commands from the pilot and SAS. Table 2
presents the pilot's Stick and rudder pedal characteris-
tics and corresponding control surface gearing and lim-
its. The pilot was provided with stick and rudder pedal
force feel by coil-spring bungees, which provided a
force proportional to stick or pedal position. The
changes in authority and gearing (table 2) resulted
from pilot in-flight evaluations and trim data. Table 3
presents control surface authority, rate, and command
input. Figure 12 presents a summary of the pilot's
longitudinal stick gearing and modifications accom-
plished over the course of the flight test program. The
stick gearing of 6.9 ° of elevon per inch of stick on the
first flight was excessively sensitive and dictated the
subsequent modifications. This will be discussed in
detail in a later section.
The limited authority SAS provided angular rate
feedback about all three axes for damping augmenta-
tion operating through servoactuators. The feedback
signals were provided by conventional angular rate
gyros. The pilot could select SAS gains using switches
on the SAS control box, located on the left-hand con-
sole. SAS gains ranging from 0 to 1.0 were available in
increments of 0.1 and were in terms of degrees of sur-
face deflection per degree per second of angular rate.
The yaw rate signal was modified by an electronic
high-pass, washout filter so that the rudder would
return to zero deflection as yaw rate approached steady
Table 2. HL-10 cockpit control summary.
Pilot's longitudinal stick
Longitudinal Elevon Force
stick authority, gradient, Gearing,
Flight authority,* in. deg Ib/in. deg/in.
1 -3 to 6 36.2 to -26 8.4 6.92
2 -3.9 to 5.2 10 to -25 8.4 3.75
4 -3.9 to 5.2 10 to -25 8.4 3.75
6 -3.8 to 5.4 3.8 to -26 8.4 3.24
10 -3.9 to 5.3 13 to -24 8.4 approx.
3.5 (non-
linear)
Pilot's lateral stick
Lateral Aileron Force
stick authority, gradient, Gearing,
Flight authority,** in. deg lb/in, deg/in.
1 +2.93 +12.5 2.74 4.27
2 +2.65 +19.2 2.74 7.25
4 +2.80 +12.1 2.74 4.32
6 +2.80 +12.1 2.74 4.32
10 +4.05 +17.0 2.74 4.27
Pilot's rudder pedal
Rudder pedal Rudder Force
authority,*** authority, gradient, Gearing,
Flight in. deg lb/in, deg/in.
All +3.1 +10.0 13.72 3.41
* + is stick aft which results in a more negative elevon
deflection
**+ is right stick deflection
***+ is a left rudder pedal deflection
state. This kept constant rate turns from being impeded,
through the system, by the command of an opposite
rudder deflection (top rudder) in response to the steady
yaw rate. This system was all analog (electrical wires
connected to resistors, capacitors, operational amplifi-
ers, etc.) with electromechanical interface and was rel-
atively simple by comparison with today's digital
computer-based flight control systems (ref. 17).
The SAS system gains were predetermined based on
flight conditions for particular planned flight profiles;
the pilots did not adjust system gains indiscriminately.
Some gain changes were required because of varying
vehicle dynamics, and some were purely for research
purposes. Occasionally, select SAS gains would be
reduced to zero to accomplish specified research
maneuvers.
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Table3. HL-10controlsurfaceauthority.
Rate,
Travel, deg/
Surface Input deg see
Pitch trim
switch -19 to 6 2
Pitch control
stick -24 to 13 25
Elevon Pitch SAS + 5 25
Aileron trim
switch + 5 0.6
Aileron con-
trol stick + 17 50
Roll SAS + 5 50
Elevon flaps Switch 0 to 29 3
"lip fin flaps Switch
Outboard 0 to 32 3
Inboard 0 to 30 3
Rudder trim
switch + 5 1
Rudder Pedal + 10 25
Yaw SAS + 5 25
Speed brake Switch 0 to 32 3
s , 3 2 1 o-1-2-3-,
-30 lllillllll
25 E 5.1.cm I Elevon range
- I _ _(2 in.), I for approach
-20I-- 7
-15 _____t_ 7 e
-10 rim
-5 -- l'S-I \ I\ _ (flights
0 2 __'_"_'_'__'_ 6 to 9)
cm 10 --Flrstfllght /'_ /X
15 -- (approxlmate)-_ i \ Z-Fina I
20 -- \ (flights_
16 12 8 4 0 -4 -8 -12
_es, cm 93o_s5
Figure 12. Elevon gearing used during flight tests.
Secondary movable surfaces were located on the
inboard and outboard trailing edges of the tip fins and
the upper surface of the elevons. An electric motor
actuated these surfaces in two-position flaps in either a
closed position for the subsonic configuration or an
opened position for the transonic configuration (fig. 7).
The transonic configuration was essentially a shuttle-
cocklike configuration with all surfaces extended to
maintain transonic and supersonic stability. The sec-
ondary flap positions for the subsonic and transonic
configurations were 5° to 29 ° for the elevon, 0 ° to 8 °
symmetric rudder, 0° to 32 ° for outboard tip fin, and 0 °
to 30 ° for inboard tip fin. The subsonic flap positions
were changed after the second flight because the data
results from flight indicated that flight elevon trim
deflection and wind-tunnel predictions differed. Data
for in-flight trim, with the elevon flap at 5 °, closely
approximated wind-tunnel data for zero elevon flap.
Landing gear comprised off-the-shelf pans from
several airplanes: The main gear wheels, tires, brakes,
and gear and door toggle locks were T-38 hardware;
the main gear shock strut was F-5A hardware; the nose
gear shock strut, wheels, and tires were T-39 hardware.
Main and nose gear were pneumatically actuated and
had extension times of approximately 1.2 and 1.5 sec,
respectively. Once lowered, the gear could not be
retracted while airborne.
FLIGHT VEHICLE MISSION
The HL-10 was carried aloft by NASA's B-52
launch aircraft (fig. 13), as were all tiffing bodies
excluding the lightweight M2-F1. The B-52 aircraft
had been modified earlier specifically to launch the
X-15 hypersonic airplanes from a right wing pylon. To
carry and launch the lifting bodies, a special adapter
was constructed and fitted to the B-52 wing pylon. The
use of this airplane was complicated because the X-15
program was still operating. The final (199th) flight of
the X-15 was launched October 24, 1968, and this very
successful program ended December 20, 1968.
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(a) In-flightview.
E-16174
Co)Groundview.
Figure13.Matedconfigurationfor HL-10andB-52.
A typicalHL-10missionwaslaunchedat45,000ft
at a Machnumberof 0.65.Elevenglide flightspre-
cededthe poweredflightsso that the pilots could
becomefamiliar with the vehiclehandlingqualities
andaerodynamicharacteristics,andsothat vehicle
systemscouldbechecked.Figure14showstheground
trackof flightsin theterminalapproachandlanding
pattern.Thelaunchpoint for the poweredflights is'
locatedsouthwestof the glide flight launchpointby
about40nmi.Thepointlabeled"runwayintersection"
is whererunways 4 and 17 met and is the point where
the vehicle normally transitioned from the transonic to
the subsonic configuration. During flight, ground radar
tracked the vehicle and provided mission control with
ground track and altitude information. Deviations from
planned profiles such as high- or low-energy states
were radioed to the pilot for appropriate corrective
action. The low key point, shown on the ground track
(fig. 14), occurred at an altitude of about 20,000 ft. The
low key point was the point at which research data
acquisition was terminated and the pilot's full attention
given to the landing approach pattern. Geographical
positioning at the intersection differed from flight to
flight depending on energy state; however, the low key
point was achieved consistently. A 180 ° turn was then
made to the final approach and landing. The landing
approach technique used in the lifting-body programs
was basically the same as that used in the X-15
program.
The average time for a glide flight was 4.2 min and
for a powered flight, 6.7 min. The average rate of
descent in gliding flight approached an unbelievable
11,000 ft/min. One pilot indicated that if a brick were
dropped from the B-52 at the same time he launched,
he would beat the brick to the ground. These descents
were exciting to witness---a real dive-bombing type of
operation. The pilots indicated that it was relatively
easy to retum to the planned flight profile from a high-
or low-energy condition before reaching the low key
point. They commented that before entering the
approach pattern and in the event that the track was
outside the pattern something other than visual refer-
ence was needed to assess the energy situation. In the
pattern the pilots could estimate their energy state well.
Most lifting-body landings were executed on the
well-marked Rogers Lake runway 18. This runway was
about 4.5 mi, or 24,000 ft, long. The final approach and
landing flare was accomplished by establishing a pre-
flare aim point (fig. 15), during the 270- to 300-knot
final approach (approximately 4000 ft above ground
level (AGL)).The unpowered approach and landing of
the HL-10 was relatively typical of each of the lifting
bodies. The execution of the landing was done in three
parts: the final approach, flare, and postflare decelera-
tion (fig. 15). The final approach was typically done at
300 knots at a flightpath angle of 16° to 18° nose down.
The flare was typically initiated at 300 to 270 knots and
1000 ft AGL (lakebed elevation is 2300 ft mean sea
level (MSL)). The flare was done at approximately 1.5
g to bring the vehicle to a relatively level flight attitude
at approximately 100 ft. At this altitude the vehicle's
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Figure 14. Typical HL-10 powered and glide flight ground track in terminal approach and landing pattern.
speed had decreased to about 220 to 240 knots and the
landing gear was lowered. The postflare deceleration
was made with touchdown between 155 to 223 knots.
Once the landing gear was down, maximum L/D was
reduced by approximately 25 percent. To the uniniti-
ated the approach, flare, and touchdown speeds seem
excessive and much concern was expresse d. To the
pilots, however, the landing speeds were no problem.
An advantage to the higher speeds was that the han-
dling qualities were better.
FLIGHT TEST PREPARATION
This phase of the story has to begin with the setting
of the scene and will include situations and events as
recalled by the authors. The story begins in early spring
of 1966 at the FRC.
The lifting-body program had now grown into a full-
scale mature program at FRC and was fully sanctioned
and funded by NASA Headquarters. We now had ade-
quate funding to accomplish all our work, but we also
had the added burden that a larger, and consequently
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Figure 15. Typical lifting-body unpowered final approach, flare, and landing segments.
more complex, organization brings to the working
troops. All of FRC's disciplinary managers were now
involved, which resulted in an increase in the number
of meetings and added paperwork. Mr. Bikle did an
excellent job of keeping the burden of a more complex
organizational structure from impeding progress, but
there were some things even he could not do. As a con-
sequence the team just had to adapt to this new situa-
tion.
Mr. Bikle was able to shield Dale and the small FRC
team when they were developing the "unofficial"
M2-F1, but now with Headquarters approval the situa-
tion was different. Paul recognized that Dale would
have to change his style as an innovative maverick to a
more conventional engineering approach, involving
many more people, to which the Center and Headquar-
ters managers could relate. Dale had promoted the
lifting-body concept of using the existing B-52/X-15
pylon with an adapter. He also promoted the idea of
using the ol-d XLR-11 rocket engines left from the
X- 15 program.
Mr. Bikle now presented Mr. Reed with some
options concerning his career. The options included
remaining as lifting-body program manager, with lim-
ited technical activity or remain as an innovator of new
ideas. Mr. Reed decided to remain the innovator and
stepped aside. Mr. Bikle then formally recommended
that Mr. Reed could benefit FRC more in the role as a
generator of new ideas. John McTigue ("Tiger John")
was named the new lifting-body program manager,
having had extensive management experience on the
X-15 program at FRC.
Within FRC an assigned group of engineers, techni-
cians, and mechanics was concemed with preparing
each vehicle for the experimental flight program.
NASA's resources were stretched to the maximum,
because the X-15, with three airplanes, was still very
active and a large percentage of our resources were
devoted to this program. As a result (and because the
USAF desired to maintain their expertise in the rocket
airplane business) it was mutually decided that the
M2-F2 simulation and general flight planning activities
would be accomplished by the USAF at the neighbor-
=ing Right Test Center. FRC would maintain the aero-
dynamic data responsibility and stability and control
coordination as well as some research functions. In
addition, all instrumentation and maintenance
functions would be continued at FRC. This freed the
FRC simulation facilities and other engineering per-
sonnel to concentrate on the HL-10.
M2-F2 Team
The USAF team was headed by Robert G. (Bob)
Hoey, program manager, and Johnny Armstrong, pro-
gram engineer, both of whom had extensive experi-
mental flight test and X-15 experience. USAF Capt.
John Durrett was also a key player and assisted with
general engineering functions, This team was relatively
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youngbut hadconsiderablexperimentalflight test
experience. Mr. Hoey had been at Edwards approxi-
mately 12 years and Mr. Armstrong, about 10 years.
Mr. Hoey had a very good relationship with NASA
management and with Mr. Bikle. Mr. Bikle had been
the AFFTC's technical director before assuming direc-
torship of NASA FRC on September 15, 1959. Mr.
Armstrong and Mr. Hoey had been closely related to
the very successful X-15 program as USAF flight test
engineers and had a large credibility base within FRC.
So this team was considered to be the experts.
HL-IO Team
The new FRC HL-10 team, with the departure of
Mr. Reed to more advanced programs, was now taking
shape. This team was relatively new and unproved; it
consisted of Garrison P. "Garry" Layton as project
engineer;, Wen Painter and Berwin Kock as vehicle sys-
tems engineers; Jon Pyle, vehicle performance (L/D);
and Mr. Kempel was responsible for stability, control
and handling qualities, and later included aero data fol-
lowing the departure of Georgene Laub. Don Bacon
was the simulation engineer. NASA's Bruce Peterson
was named HL-10 program pilot. For a partial list of
the HL-10 team members, see appendix B; figure 16
shows some of the team members.
This team had only three to six years of experience.
We were the neophytes. We were all under Mr.
McTigue, although we also all had disciplinary manag-
ers over us. Our task was to prepare the HL-10 for its
maiden flight. Our work progressed steadily. The real-
time simulator was checked out and declared opera-
tional. The pilots who flew the HL-10 simulation felt
that its handling qualities and LID (performance) were
"too good" by comparison with the M2-F2. According
to the simulator the HL-10 appeared to be much more
stable and in general handled significantly better than
the M2-F2 and had better L/D. We always had a diffi-
cult time convincing the pilots that we knew what we
were doing. Before flight they remained skeptical. Our
desire, of course, was to have simulations somewhat
pessimistic rather the other way around. We did not
want to foster overconfidence.
Some of the program pilots, the NASA program
manager, Mr. Bikle, and the USAF M2-F2 team
(experts) were suspicious and skeptical of our results.
We were the new kids on the block, untried and
unproven. Managers would pass us in the corridors and
I
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Figure 16. Members of NASA/USAF HL-10 test team. From left to right are Don Bacon, Bob Kempcl, Alex Sim,
Berwin Kock, George Sitterle, Jack Cates, Wen Painter, Bill Link, Richard Blair, A1 Harris, Bill Lovett, Herb
Anderson, Bill Mersereau, Charles Russell, Art Anderson, Jerry Gentry, Bruce Peterson, and John McTigue.
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shake their heads. Comments to us were, "It can't be
that good!" Our work, however, progressed and Mr.
Layton attempted to keep us on track. We really were
not a team just yet. We were a group of individuals,
working as individuals toward a common goal--but
not a team. Our approach to completing our tasks was
not necessarily lacking in quality, but rather lacking in
experience. We were somewhat unsure of ourselves.
Even so we accomplished all objectives in preparation
for flight.
FLIGHT TESTING
Before the first free flight of each heavy-weight
lifting-body, a series of captive manned check flights
was planned. These captive flights were planned to
evaluate all lifting-body systems and subsystems
before actual launch. The HL-10 completed two cap-
tive flights in late 1966.
The Maiden Flight
Shortly before Christmas 1966 the HL-10 team con-
vinced Mr. Bikle, the rest of NASA, and USAF man-
agement that we were ready for our first glide flight.
All the necessary engineering, systems, and mechani-
cal work on the airplane, piloted simulation, paper-
work, and briefings were completed. By this time our
project pilot, Mr. Peterson, had flown 2 unpowered
flights in the M2-F2, and the M2-F2 had completed 14
flights since July with 4 different pilots.
On December 21, the HL-10 was positioned beneath
the right wing of the B-52 and lifted into position. The
vehicle was attached to the B-52 and preflight checks
completed. Later that day the flight was aborted
because of a tip-fin flap electrical failure. On this flight
the tip fins did not need to be repositioned, so the wir-
ing was disconnected and stowed. Early the next day,
December 22, all preparations for the first free flight
were completed. Mr. Peterson (fig. 17) took his place in
the cockpit, the crew strapped him in, and he initiated
preflight checks. The canopy was lowered and all
ground preparations were now complete. The B-52
started engines and taxied to the Edwards AFB main
runway 04 for takeoff. The takeoff was smooth, as
were all prelaunch HL-10 checks. Everything was
ready. The flight plan called for a launch point
E-16199
Figure 17. NASA pilot Bruce Peterson, following first
HL-10 glide flight.
approximately 3 mi east of the east shoreline of Rogers
Lake abeam of the landing lakebed runway 18 (fig. 14).
A launch heading to the north was followed by two left
turns. The launch point was almost directly over the
USAF Rocket Propulsion Test Site. This ground track
looked much like a typical left-hand pattern with the
launch on the downwind leg, a base leg, a tum to final,
and a final approach to runway 18.
Launch from the B-52 was from 45,000 ft at an air-
speed of 170 knots at 10:38:50 am Pacific standard
time. The actual launch was very similar to simulator
predictions. Airplane trim was much as expected
although the pilot sensed what he described as a high-
frequency buffet in pitch and some in roll, later specifi-
cally identified as a flight control system limit cycle,
and as speed increased it got noticeably worse. In addi-
tion to this, as the first turn was executed, the pilot
noticed that the pitch stick sensitivity was excessively
high. The stick sensitivity resulted in too much (objec-
tionable) pitching motion for relatively small pilot
pitch stick movement. As the flight progressed the
high-frequency limit cycle increased in amplitude and
it was obvious that longitudinal stick was excessively
sensitive. Difficulties in the roll axis were masked by
the pitch problems. The landing was accomplished
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Figure18.FirstHL-10glideflightlandingflare.
somewhatprematurelybecause of the sensitive control
problem. The landing flare (fig. 18) was initiated at
approximately 320 knots with touchdown at about 280
knots, or about 30 knots faster than anticipated. The
total flight time was 189 sec (3 min and 9 sec) from
launch (45,000 ft MSL) to touchdown (2,300 ft MSL).
The average descent rate was almost 14,000 fthnin.
Mr. Peterson was greatly concerned with the pitch
sensitivity and limit cycles. The amplitude of these
became larger as a function of vehicle airspeed and
system gain setting (ref. 17). The pilot made several
adjustments to the pitch gain in an attempt to alleviate
the problem. He gave the pitch axis a Cooper-Harper
pilot rating of 4 for the entire flight. A rating of 4 indi-
cates that the deficiencies warrant improvement and are
not satisfactory without improvement. The limit cycle
was a 2.75-Hz oscillation feeding through the SAS.
The problem was primarily in the pitch axis and was
most severe during the last third of the flight despite the
fact that the pitch SAS gain was reduced from 0.6 deg/
deg/sec to 0.2 deg/deg/sec during the flight. The prob-
lem was also manifested in the roll axis, but to a much
lesser degree. Toward the end of the flight the pitch
limit cycle oscillation magnitude was approximately
0.4 g peak-to-peak at 2.75 Hz.
The flight was very disappointing to us and con-
firmed the opinions of the experts that the HL- 10 team
really did not know what they were up to. The flight
was quite poor as compared with our preflight simula-
tion and analyses. Our morale (perhaps pride) was at a
low ebb. We felt that NASA management must be even
more skeptical of our abilities and we felt that our Air
Force M2-F2 brethren were looking down their noses
at us too. Fortunately, NASA management was patient,
and because the holiday season was upon us, we all
took a few days off and came back to consider what our
options were.
The haphazard arrangement of the mountain of data
that were transmitted from the vehicle during flight to
the ground station for the engineers to view (real-time)
was indicative of our inexperience. The data were not
arranged in a logical manner that would facilitate post-
flight analysis. (That is, certain physical relationships
exist between certain sets of data; and when they are
viewed as sets, better insight is given into how a vehi-
cle behaves dynamically.) This resulted in the initial
oversight of certain types of vehicle dynamic behavior
that, perhaps, should have been more obvious to the
test team, as we found later.
Following the holidays, initial discussions seemed to
lead us to the conclusion that if we fixed the stick sensi-
tivity and lowered the SAS gains we could probably try
another flight. There was, however, a lone dissenter in
the group. Mr. Painter was not convinced that we had
completely understood all the problems. He continued
to analyze the flight results and argued against another
attempt, even though the project pilot convinced Mr.
Bride that we should attempt a second flight. Our confi-
dence shaken, we initiated an in-depth unified analysis
of the flight data at the beginning of 1967 with a fresh
perspective.
Very subtly we found ourselves being welded into a
real team. Each of us knew what our job was and
expended all effort to understand exactly what hap-
pened on that first flight and to fix the problems--what-
ever they were. We found two almost immediately.
Postflight Analysis
Two serious problems were identified even before
touchdown.P0stflight data evaluation substantiated the
following:
• Large amplitude (limit cycles) in the SAS; a
2.75-Hz elevon oscillation feeding through SAS.
• Extreme sensitivity in the longitudinal stick from
the high pitch stick gearing of 6.92 ° of clevon
travel per inch of stick travel; large vehicle
motions for small stick deflections.
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Thefirst problemwasapparentlycausedby higher-
than-predictedelevoncontroleffectivenessandfeed-
backof a 2.75-Hzlimit cycleoscillationthroughthe
SAS(fig. 14).Theproblemwasalleviatedbymodify-
ingthestructuralresonance22-Hzmodelead-lagfilter,
whichwasinstalledbefore the first flight. The modifi-
cation consisted of a notch filter and a lead-lag network
in the SAS electronics (refs. 18 and 19). (A notch filter
is a device that filters a nuisance frequency while hav-
ing relatively little effect on lower and higher frequen-
cies.) The problem was solved by installing a structural
notch filter, with a center (or notch) frequency of
22 Hz, and using lower SAS gains.
The second problem, stick sensitivity, was solved by
a relatively simple gearing modification of the longitu-
dinal stick. Figure 12 presents the pilot's longitudinal
stick gearing used on the first flight and subsequent
flights. On the first flight the gearing was 6.9°/in. of
elevon per unit stick. This was much too sensitive. The
result was large vehicle motions for small stick deflec-
tions. The nonlinear gearing used from flights l0 to 37
was nonlinear and was approximately 3.5°/in. in the
devon range for landing or approximately half of that
used for the first flight. This type of problem was easy
to miss when all preparation for flight was accom-
plished on a fixed-base engineering simulator. In the
simulation environment, the situation is relatively
relaxed and participating pilots usually feel they are in
a safe environment. If anything goes wrong, they can
always reset the computers. In addition, the trim char-
acteristics of a new airplane are not precisely known.
Stick sensitivity, whether longitudinal or lateral, has
always been difficult to determine in fixed-base simula-
tions. Pilots (particularly fighter pilots) always want a
very responsive airplane; however, when real-world
motion and visual cues are experienced their opinion
frequently is revised, and this case was no exception.
A third problem was more illusive and was not
really apparent to the pilot or test team during the ini-
tial postflight analysis. This problem was found to
affect controllability of the vehicle at some points in
the flight profile. The problem was a lack of longitudi-
nal and lateral-directional control at some portions of
the flight. (This problem was not identified by the pilot
and was not immediately obvious to the engineers on
the program until further analysis was accomplished.)
As mentioned before, most members of the test team,
including the project pilot, felt that if we could reduce
system gains and fix the longitudinal stick gearing
problem and then fly another flight we would be better
able to pin down other problems. We had Mr. Bikle
talked into another flight except for the dissenting vote
from Mr. Painter. Mr. Painter felt that we were missing
something. When he spoke, we listened--at least on
this occasion. We, therefore, postponed plans for
another flight until we had done additional analysis.
An in-depth investigation was completed by Mr.
Kempel. His investigation is described in the following
paragraphs. These paragraphs are recollections from 26
years ago (late 1966 to mid-1993) and may be subject
to errors in memory.
We had generated the HL-10 simulation from wind-
tunnel results. In essence we constructed a computer-
ized (analog computer) mathematical model or
aerodynamic characteristic representation of the
HL-10. Before we had flown, we made the assumption
that this model was a relatively accurate representation
of the actual flight vehicle. We reasoned that if we
input flight-recorded control inputs to the computer-
ized model, and this model was an accurate representa-
tion of the flight vehicle at the same flight conditions,
then the model dynamics, calculated motions, should
be similar to the flight vehicle. (This technique has
been used over the years to validate aerodynamic data
from actual flight tests.) If, for some reason, the flight
vehicle motions did not resemble the model motions,
adjustments are then made to the model aerodynamic
parameters to attempt to obtain a relatively close dupli-
cation of the flight motions. Ideally, the model would
exactly match the flight. This situation is seldom real-
ized, however. Some adjustments to the aerodynamic
parameters are always necessary to match flight as
closely as possible. In this way we then determined
where the wind-tunnel aerodynamics differed from
flight. We also needed to understand why they were
different.
From the first flight results, 12 specific maneuvers
were selected as candidates for computer matching.
These maneuvers were from 5 to 15 sec in duration. Of
the 12 maneuvers only 7 were matched successfully,
and these matches were considered only marginally
acceptable. A good match is one in which the computer
solution overlays all of the flight recorded parameters,
within the specified time interval, with little differences
between the two. The remaining five maneuvers were
impossible to match; the computer solutions did not
remotely resemble the flight data, the actual vehicle
response. The obvious reason for this was that the
mathematical model was not accurate. With that being
the case, the task then became to find out why. From
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whatweknewwe shouldhavebeenrelatively close,
but we were not. A further examination of the flight
data was needed.
The entire fright recorded data were played back
through the ground station, with the data recorded on
magnetic tape, and then reviewed the results. This
time, however, we selected new groupings for parame-
ters. The data were now arranged in a logical manner
that would facilitate postflight analysis so that the
physical relationships between certain sets of data
would give us better insight into how the vehicle was
behaving dynamically. We selected families of specific
data such as accelerations, angular rates next to the
control inputs, and control surface strain gauges. All of
these data were plotted as a function of time. Using this
approach we could look at eight channels of data on
each strip chart. This approach was very revealing. The
three sets of data indicated some very interesting fea-
tures. Each of the traces, although of different parame-
ters, generally moved with the appropriate responses,
indicating the motion of the vehicle. However, during
certain portions of the flight some of the traces became
blurred and fuzzy, particularly the control surface
strain-gauge data as some higher frequency distur-
bance appeared. With all the data lined up on a
common time interval, many data traces displayed a
similar phenomenon. In addition it was discovered that
there were two significant intervals (figs. 19(a) and
19(b)) during which the pilot had commanded signifi-
cant amounts of aileron, but the vehicle did not respond
until the AOA was reduced. This particular problem
was not apparent to the pilot, and he made little or no
comment about this during the flight or postflight
discussions. Something did, however, disturb him rela-
tive to the vehicle response to control input, which
caused us to investigate further.
It was apparent that each time this situation
occurred, the AOA was above 11° to 13° (to the left of
points A and B on figs. 19(a) and 19(b), respectively)
and as AOA decreased through these values the aile-
rons suddenly became very effective by producing
significant amounts of roll angular rate (30 ° to 45 ° per
second). We then attempted to computer-match these
two time intervals. The two computer matches of these
time intervals showed that in each case the initial part
of the response would not match. As the AOA was
reduced to the point that the ailerons became effective,
the mathematical model began to match the flight data.
We still did not know why.
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We began to think that a massive flow separation
was possible over the upper aft portion of the vehicle at
the higher angles of attack, causing the control surfaces
to lose a large percentage of their effectiveness. Figure
20 presents a 55-sec recording of the inboard right and
left tip-fin strain-gauge data traces from flight. Note
that the flight-measured AOA trace in this figure is
indicated and not corrected as in figures 19(a) and
19(b), so no direct comparison of AOA can be made.
Significant postflight AOA corrections were required
for such things as the angular difference between the
noseboom and the vehicle's longitudinal reference
axis, upwash, boom bending due to normal accelera-
tion, pitch angular rate, etc. AOA is included in figure
20 as a qualitative indicator of the flow separation, 0 °
AOA on this scale will correspond to approximately 7°
on figure 19.
Figure 20 encompasses the same time interval as fig-
ures 19(a) and 19(b), and points A and B are illustrated
for comparison. At the beginning, time is 0 sec of fig-
ure 19(a), the AOA is 17°, and the flow is separated. As
the AOA is reduced, through 11° (point A), the flow
attaches abruptly. Between 5 and 10 sec, the AOA is
increased to approximately 15° , and the flow separates
(the trace gets fuzzy). At approximately 34 sec the
AOA is reduced through 13.5 ° (fig. 19(b)), and the
flow becomes dramatically attached once more (point
B). This flow separation can be likened to the sudden
loss of lift and increase in drag of a conventional wing
as AOA is increased and the wing stalls. As the AOA
was decreased the airflow would suddenly reattach and
the controls would behave in their normal fashion. The
more we looked at the data, the more plausible this
theory seemed; although the wind-tunnel data did not
indicate a problem to the degree that we had experi-
enced in flight. The data also indicated a significant
loss of lift-to-drag ratio above Mach numbers of 0.5
and AOA of 12 °. This finding further convinced us that
the problem was caused by massive flow separation.
About this time we decided to call the team at
NASA Langley and give them a preliminary assess-
ment of our findings. They agreed to reenter the wind
tunnel with the 0.063-scale model (16 in. long) almost
immediately. This was highly unusual because, typi-
cally, wind-tunnel schedules are made at least a year,
and sometimes years, in advance. This was, however,
their "baby."
With NASA Langley's urging, we made the trip east
to present first-hand our results and hypothesis. At Lan-
gley's high-speed 7 x 10 ft wind-tunnel building, we
gathered in the middle of an office room at a large
table. Those present from Langley included Linwood
(Wayne) McKinny, Bill Kemp, Tommy Toll, and Bob
Taylor, from FRC, Mr. Painter, Mr. Kock, Mr. Layton,
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Figure 20. Inboard tip-fin flap strain-gauge and angle-of-attack response.
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andMr. Kempel.Wepresentedourhypothesisthatthe
problemwasmassiveflow separation.At onepoint
Bob Taylorjumpedup from the table and angrily
slammedhismechanicalpencilto thefloor,ashegave
fortha streamof oaths.Wewereall shockedby this
outburst.WhenMr. Taylorcalmeddownhe resumed
hisplaceatthetable,saying,"I knewthatthiswould
bea problem!"Hehada gut feelingearlier,hesaid,
thattheflowseparationtheyhad'seenonthewind-tun-
nel modelwouldbeworsein flight.Mr. Taylorwas
upsetwith himself that he had not followed his
instinctsasanaemdynamicistandtakenpreventative
measuresin thedesignof theHL-10beforethevehicle
hadbeenbuilt.Furtherdiscussionwaslimitedto figur-
ing out howto proceed.TheNASALangleypeople
promisedtogivetheproblemtheirimmediateattention
andtoproposearemedy.
Uponarrivalbackat FRC we agreednot fly the
HL-10until wehadsomekindof aerodynamicconfig-
urationchange.Westill hadotherproblemsto solve.
Weenlistedtheaidof Northropto designtheelectronic
notchfilter to eliminatethe2.75-Hzlimit cyclemode
fromfeedingbackthroughtheflightcontrolsystem.In
additionto thiswehadthesticksensitivityproblem.
Webusiedourselveswithsolvingtheseproblemswhile
keepingin touchwiththeLangleypeople.
OnMay10,1967theM2-F2crashlanded,seriously
injuringour projectpilot, BrucePeterson.Hewould
havetobereplaced,butwewouldhavetoworryabout
thatlater.
Throughoutthewinterandspringof 1967theLan-
gley teamcontinuedto work the problemandthey
cameupwith twopossiblefixes.Thesewereidentified
asmodificationsI andII. Bothmodificationsconcen-
tratedonchangesto theoutboardverticalfins.Modifi-
cationI proposeda thickeningandcamberingof the
inside of the fins while modificationII proposed
slightlyextendingandcamberingthe leadingedges.
Figure21 presentsa comparisonbetweenmodifica-
tions(refs.20and21).NASALangleyranafull setof
wind-tunneltestson both proposed modifications and
sent the data to FRC for review. Although the Langley
team presented their assessment of the wind-tunnel
results, they would not decide which modification
should be selected for the flight vehicle. This decision
was left to the FRC team.
During the summer of 1967, with all the wind-
tunnel preliminary data in hand, an extensive evalua-
tion was made by Mr. Kempel. "Preliminary data" was
the wind-tunnel guys way of telling us that they had
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worked most of their magic in data reduction, but that
they were not going to say that this was the last word.
Mr. Kempel began to plot all the data, from digital list-
ings, by hand. Thousands of points were plotted in this
manner. This may shock modem-day engineers who
have computer-plotting routines, but in those days this
was the way we did it. This approach also made us live
with the data. Mr. Kempel plotted the data from both
modifications as a function of AOA for constant Mach
numbers. All of the plot scales were made uniform so
comparisons would be easier.
When the plotting was completed, all data were
lined up for comparison. These data, at first glance, did
not seem a lot different from the data set used to gener-
ate the original HL-10 simulation. Some subtle but sig-
nificant differences were there, though. Some
nonlinearities in the original data were not present. Mr.
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Kempelhypothesizedthatif thesenonlinearitiesindi-
catedflow separation,thenthe lack of these would
indicate either no flow separation or separation to a
lesser degree. Based on this premise, modification II
was selected as the fix. Mr. Kempel presented his
hypothesis to his FRC disciplinary boss, Hal Walker, a
competent aerodynamicist, and he agreed with him.
Mr. Kempel then presented the results to FRC manage-
ment and, with the NASA Langley team concurrence,
we proceeded to modify the vehicle.
To modify the configuration, we contracted with
Northrop Norair once again in early autumn 1967.
Northrop and NASA decided that a fiberglass glove
backed by metal structure would accomplish all
configuration objectives very nicely. Work continued
on the glove through the winter. In the NASA hangar,
Norair's Fred Erb shed his normal working attire--a
suit--and donned coveralls to assist in installing the
glove. He was a senior-level engineer with over
25 years with Northrop, rolling up his sleeves and get-
ting his hands dirty.
In the spring of 1968 the final stages of vehicle prep-
aration--flight controls work, aerodynamic configura-
tion change, and internal systems work--were
completed. With the injury of Mr. Peterson in the
M2-F2 landing accident, Air Force Capt. Jerry Gentry
was named as HL-10 program pilot. Capt. Gentry
approached the simulation preparation with just a little
apprehension. His apprehension was never verbalized,
but we could tell he felt that the simulation really did
look too good. But it did look good by comparison with
the M2-F2. Capt. Gentry, a true professional, gave the
flight preparation his complete attention. After many
hours of simulation time, he was finally ready to fly.
This was what we were all waiting for. For Capt.
Gentry_ this was his profession. For us, the engineers,
we wanted very much to vindicate ourselves. Fifteen
months after the first flight we were ready for the sec-
ond flight. The struggles of the past year had trans-
formed us into a first-rate team. Now we had a second
chance to prove it to ourselves, FRC, NASA Langley,
the USAF, and the world.
The Second Flight
The second flight was made on March 15, 1968 with
Capt. Gentry (fig. 22) at the controls. It was a typical
lifting-body flight, launched from 45,000 ft at a Mach
number of 0.65. The flight plan called for pitch and roll
E-18875
Figure 22. USAF Capt. Jerry Gentry, HL-10 project
pilot.
maneuvering to allow the pilot to feel the airplane.
Mild pitch and roll maneuvers were performed up to
15° AOA to evaluate the possibility of control
degradation similar to the first flight. The pilot exe-
cuted a simulated landing flare, to 2 g, at altitude to
assess the potential flare characteristics. A motion-
picture camera was installed on the tip of the vertical
fin to view the right inboard tip-fin flap and right
elevon. These surfaces were tufted so that in-flight pho-
tographs could be taken and the flow field could be
qualitatively assessed. Tufting was an old method by
which flight testers attached strips or strands of wool
yam, approximately 6 in. long, to one end of suspected
problem portions of an airplane to assess the quality of
the airflow. If the airflow was attached the tufts would
lie flat along the surface in the direction of the flow. If
the flow was separated the tufts would follow the dis-
turbed flow in a random fashion. In general it was con-
cluded that the flow did not significantly separate and
there was no degradation of control; however, some
sensitivity to AOA was observed. Total flight time,
from B-52 launch to touchdown, was approximately
4.4 min.
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Theflightwasa successfromeverybody'spointof
view. From the pilot's point of view, the HL-10 per-
formed as well as an F-104 airplane making a similar
approach. The longitudinal stick was a bit sensitive, but
was considered acceptable. The pilot felt that the vehi-
cle flew satisfactorily, and for the next flight no addi-
tional improvements were required. From the team's
point of view, we had done it and we really were a
team. There was no hint of flow separation or control
system problems. We had vindicated ourselves. The
dynamics of the HL-10 in flight looked as good as indi-
cated by the simulator. The dynamics of the HL-10
were significantly better than those of the M2. We
established our credibility. From this point on all the
pilots wanted their shot at flying the HL-10.
Now it was time to fine-tune the airplane as
required. After pilots have established confidence .in a
new airplane and have more time to evaluate things,
their opinions frequently change. The HL-10 was no
exception, although no additional major modifications
were required. Throughout the life of the program, the
HL-10 underwent minor adjustments to make it the
best of the best. Following the first (somewhat unsuc-
cessful) flight, the HL-10 made 36 successful flights
with 4 different pilots participating in the program.
Simulation of the HL-10
The HL-10 real-time simulation was an engineering
tool and not specifically a pilot training simulator, as
one would think of training airline pilots. The HL-10
simulator was fixed base, with a instrument panel simi-
lar to the flight vehicle and pilot's control stick and rud-
der pedals closely approximating the actual airplane.
No visual displays were available, so all piloting tasks
were accomplished using instruments. The instrument
panel included airspeed, altitude, AOA, normal accel-
eration, and control surface position displays. A three-
axis attitude indicator provided vehicle attitude and
sideslip information. Both the engineers and pilots
used the simulation extensively. Engineers used the
simulation as a final validation of control system con-
figuration. Control gearing selection was always diffi-
cult with the fixed base; the pilots always wanted high
sensitivity until they were airborne, then we had to
decrease gearing.
Later, the simulation was used to plan each research
flight mission. So that mission objectives would be
achieved, research maneuvers were specified and flight
profiles determined flaat included Mach numbers, alti-
tudes, angles of attack, and ground track. Emergency
procedures were practiced by inducing various failure
modes and selection of altemate landing sites. The
pilots were relatively willing subjects once they knew
that they would fly the actual mission and the training
paid large dividends. From all thiS, flight cards would
be assembled and distributed at crew briefings to all
personnel such as chase and B-52 pilots, the mission
controller, participating flight test engineers, and
NASA and USAF managers. Coordination was critical
to the success of each mission.
An interesting aspect of flight test planning was that
all of the pilots reported that, once in flight, the events
of the mission seemed to progress more rapidly than in
the simulator. As a result, we experimented with speed-
ing up the simulation integration rates or making the
apparent time progress faster. We found that making
simulation time move so that approximately 40 sec of
simulation time represented approximately 60 sec in
flight, then the events in actual flight would seem to
occur at the correct rate. Only the final simulation plan-
ning sessions for a given flight were conducted in this
way.
The initial simulation of the HL-10 was accom-
plished on the analog computers at the FRC. The real
capability of the analog computer was its ability to
integrate differential equations. And because the equa-
tions of motion for the lifting bodies were differential
equations, as are all aerospace vehicle equations of
motion, we mechanized these on the available analog
computers. Digital computers of the early to mid-1960s
were used primarily for data reduction, not real-time
simulation. The analog computers were fast and there
were no problems with cycle time. The big problem
with analog computers was their inability to easily gen-
erate nonlinear functions such as aerodynamic data. In
short, analog computers left much to be desired when
mechanizing highly nonlinear functions.
With the HL-10 modification-II aerodynamic data
and our desire to mechanize the highest fidelity simula-
tion possible, we purchased a relatively high-speed
digital computer to generate the nonlinear aerodynamic
functions_ We interfaced this computer with the analog
computer, where the integrations were accomplished,
and moved into the world of hybrid computation. This
approach proved to be successful and allowed us to
make fast, efficient changes to the aerodynamic data-
base when required.
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Althoughtheprogramengineers did not know it, the
simulation engineers experimented with moving all of
the mathematical computations, including the integra-
tions, to the digital computer. When this work was
completed, they demonstrated an all-digital, real-time
simulation to the program engineers. Neither the pro-
gram engineers nor the pilots could teU the difference.
Another milestone was achieved. The HL-10 success-
fully transitioned from the analog computer to the all-
digital computer, real-time simulation world.*
The First Lifting-Body Powered Flight
The first lifting-body powered flight was attempted
with the HL-10 on October 23, 1968 with Capt. Gentry
at the controls. The rocket failed shortly after launch
requiring propellant jettison and an emergency landing
on Rosamond (Dry) Lake, 10 mi southwest of Rogers
Lake, but within the boundary of Edwards AFB. The
first successful lifting-body powered flight was subse-
quently made on November 13 with John Manke at the
controls.
The First Supersonic Lifting-Body Flight
The first supersonic flight achieved by a lifting body
was accomplished on May 9, 1969 by Mr. Manke
(figs. 23(a) and 23(b)) in the HL-10 on its 17th flight.
On this date the HL-10 reached a maximum altitude of
53,300 ft and a Mach number of 1.13.
The flight plan called for a launching approximately
30 mi northeast of Edwards AFB, igniting three rocket
chambers, rotating to an AOA of 20 °, maintaining 20 °
AOA until pitch attitude was 40 °, and maintaining 40 °
pitch attitude until an altitude of 50,000 ft was reached.
At 50,000 ft, a pushover to 6 ° AOA and acceleration to
a supersonic Mach number of 1.08 was planned. This
was to be followed by changing AOA and turning off
another rocket chamber and maintaining constant
Mach number while gathering data. The maximum
Mach number was to be 1.08. Landing was to be the
typical 360 ° approach with a landing on runway 18.
Mr. Manke later reported that during the flight
"everything went real well." Although there were some
*All NASA Dryden flight simulation work in the 1990s so far
has been accomplished using small, high-speed digital computers.
(a) Pilot John Manke.
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(b) Left to right, John Manke (in pressure suit), Wen
Painter, Herb Anderson, Jack Kolf, and Joe Huxman.
Figure 23. Members of ilL-10 project.
comments concerning the preflight checks, flight, and
comparisons with the simulator and the landing
approach, everything went according to plan. This
flight experience contrasted significantly with the initial
ground simulation preparations for it. Some interesting
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occurredleadinguptothis firstlifting-bodysupersonic
flight.
In preparationfor theflight, a completereviewof
thewind-tunnelaerodynamicdatawasmade.In addi-
tion,thepredicteddynamiccharacteristicsandvehicle
controllabilityin the transonicandsupersonicflight
regimeswerereassessed.BetweentheMachnumbers
of 0.9and1.0thedataindicatedanareaof low,oreven
slightly negative,directionalstability at anglesof
attackof 25.5° andabove.Predictionsandthesimula-
tor indicatedacceptablel velsof longitudinalandlat-
eral-directionaldynamicstabilityatall anglesof attack
andMachnumbers.A detailedtechnicalbriefingwas
giventoNASAandUSAFmanagementteams.
TheHL-10(andlifting bodiesin general)hadvery
highlevelsof effectivedihedral,andthis,in combina-
tionwith positiveanglesof attackandacceptablel v-
elsof directionalstability,ensuredlateral-directional
dynamicstabilityalmosteverywherein theflightenve-
lope.It wasdemonstratedthattheHL-10wouldexhibit
dynamiclateral-directionalstability,evenif thestatic
directionalstabilitywaszeroor slightlynegative,pro-
videdtheAOAdidnotapproachzero.Toproveto our
pilot,Mr. Manke,thatevenwith thedirectionalstabil-
ity setto zerothevehiclewouldremaindynamically
stable,wegenerateda specialsimulationdemonstra-
tiondatasetwith thestaticdirectionalstabilitysetto
zeroat all Machnumbersandanglesof attack.This
wouldbetrueif, andonlyif, theAOAwassomeposi-
tivevalueanddid notapproachzero.Wesuccessfully
demonstratedto Mr. Mankethatevenwiththispurely
fictitious,grossadjustmentto thedataset,theHL-10
wouldremaindynamicallystable.
As fatewouldhaveit, Mr. Manke,beinga diligent
testpilot,wasin thesimulatorpracticingfor his first
supersonicflight duringhis lunchhour (brownbag
besidehim).At this particularsimulationsession,no
programengineerswerepresentandthe simulation
engineerinadvertentlyloadedthewrongaerodynamic
datasetinto thecomputer--thedatasetwiththedirec-
tionalstabilityeverywheresettozero.Thiswasadem-
onstrationdata set and not to be usedfor flight
planning.With the programloaded,the simulation
engineerdepartedforlunch.Heleft thinkingthatnoth-
ing couldpossiblygowrong,becauseall Mr. Manke
hadto dowashit theoperateandresetswitches.Asthe
simulatorunprogressedandMr. Mankeachievedthe
plannedaltitudefor the accelerationto supersonic
speed,hepushedthenoseover(towardzeroAOA)and
thevehiclebecameviolentlyunstablein alateraldirec-
tion.Theflightplancalledfor thepilot to pushoverto
only 6° AOA, but he must have inadvertently
approachedAOA= 0".Mr.Mankecrashedin thesimu-
lator.Not knowingexactlywhat to do, Mr. Manke
expressedhisintenseconcernsto NASAmanagement
beforereportingtheproblemto theprogramengineers,
whowereoff havinglunchsomeplace.
Beforetheprogramengineersknewwhatwashap-
pening,wewereall summonedto oneof the wood
paneledexecutiveoffices--the"Bikle barrel"aswe
calledit. ThosepresentfromtheprojectwereMr. Lay-
ton,Mr.Painter,Mr. Kock,andMr. Kempel.Fromthe
managementsideMr. Bikle, JoeWeil, Directorof
Research,andJackFischel,hisdeputy,werethere.The
projectpilot,Mr.Manke,wasnotamongthecrowd.So
therewestoodin theboss'office,tryingtoexplainwhy
wewouldtry to kill aperfectlygoodresearchpilot, a
guyweall kind of liked,evenif hewasfrom South
Dakota.Thesceneturned ugly. We can remember that
the door seemed such a long distance from where we
were and a formidable barrier of high-level managers
sto_od between us and it. We had obviously been judged
guilty, and all that remained was for the sentence to be
passed. After the feeding frenzy abated, we were given
our say. It dawned on us what had happened. We
explained the problem and followed this up with a
demonstration in the simulation lab. Once the correct
aero data set was loaded into the simulator, the situa-
tion was much improved and no dynamic instability
was encountered (as predicted) either in the simulation
or in flight. We again (remembering the words of Dr.
Dryden) separated the real from the imagined and
made known the overlooked. In this situation we
project engineers were the victims of the unexpected.
This story indicates how at least one of the pilots
viewed the simulation once credibility was estab-
lished-he believed what he experienced. We had
intentionally programmed the wrong data into the sim-
ulation, for demonstration purposes, and our cleverness
backfired. Simulation is an extremely powerful engi-
neering tool; however, great care must be taken in its
mechanization or the results may be totally misleading
and could even be catastrophic.
Following this, on May 9, 1969 (a beautiful spring
day in the Mojave Desert), Mr. Manke made history by
successfully completing the world's first supersonic
lifting-body flight. We do not think the actual flight
was as exciting as the events leading up to it. From
31
what we rememberof the flight, it was relatively
uneventful except for going supersonic. Richard P.
Hallion, in his book, On the Frontier (ref. 10), calls this
first supersonic flight "a major milestone in the entire
lifting-body program." He goes on to say that "the
HL-10 thus became the fastest and highest flying
piloted lifting body."
The Fastest and the Highest
On February 18, 1970, in the 34th flight of the
HL-10, USAF Captain Pete Hoag (fig. 24) achieved a
Mach number of 1.86; nine days later, on the 35th
flight, NASA pilot William H. "Bill" Dana (fig. 25)
reached an altitude of 90,303 ft. The fastest flight was
launched approximately 30 mi southwest of Edwards,
heading 059 ° magnetic, at an altitude of 47,000 ft. The
flight plan called for igniting all four rocket chambers
immediately after launch. The vehicle was rotated to
23 ° AOA until a pitch attitude of 55 ° was attained. The
55 ° attitude was maintained until an altitude of
58,000 ft was reached. At 58,000 ft a pushover to 0 g
was executed (AOA - 0 °) and maintained until fuel
exhaustion occurred. The maximum Mach number was
1.86 at 67,310 ft. This was the fastest that any of the
lifting bodies would fly. The remainder of the flight
was relatively routine with a typical lakebed landing.
The duration of this flight from B-52 launch to touch-
down was 6.3 min.
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Figure 24. USAF Major Pete Hoag, HL-10 project
pilot.
E-20288
Figure 25. I-IL-10 pilot Bill Dana.
Mr. Dana was the third NASA research test pilot to
fly the HL-10. Mr. Dana had flown the final (199th)
X-15 flight in late October 1968 and made his first
HL-10 glide flight on April 25, 1969. His flight to max-
[mum altitude was also launched approximately 30 mi
southwest of Edwards, heading 059 ° magnetic, at an
altitude of 45,000 ft. The flight plan called for the igni-
tion of all four rocket chambers immediately after
launch. The vehicle was rotated to 23 ° AOA until a
pitch attitude of 55 ° was attained. The 55" attitude was
maintained up to 76,000 ft. At this altitude Mr. Dana
performed a pushover to an AOA of 7° until a Mach
number of 1.15 was attained. At Mach 1.15 and 7°
AOA the speed brakes were deployed, increasing the
AOA to 15 °. The maximum Mach number was 1.314
and altitude was 90,303 ft. This was the highest altitude
that any of the lifting bodies would achieve. The
remainder of the flight was routine, except that the
landing was accomplished on lakebed runway 23 (to
the east of runway 18, not shown on fig. 14) because of
a high crosswind on the normal landing runway. The
flight to maximum altitude, from B-52 launch to touch-
down, lasted 6.9 min.
Flight-Determined Lift and Drag
Certainly any aerospace vehicle must have adequate
controllability to achieve success. The modified HL- 10
possessed very good control characteristics. Equally
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important, as indicated earlier, was its ability to gener-
ate and control lift. Much of the success of the HL-10
was its relatively high LID in its subsonic configura-
tion. The maximum LID for the HL-10, measured in
flight, was 3.6 at an AOA of approximately 15° in the
modified subsonic configuration with the landing gear
up and no speed brake deployed. Figure 26 presents the
flight-determined LID for this configuration, as a func-
tion of coefficient of lift, at M - 0.6 (ref. 22). This
curve presents a faired line through numerous flight
data points from trimmed flight conditions. Both the
front and back sides of the/JD curve are illustrated.
The lift curve slope from this reference is a linear func-
tion of trimmed AOA. Typical of a negatively cam-
bered airfoil, the coefficient of lift at zero AOA was a
negative value. This figure presents the angles of attack
for three coefficients of lift. While reference 22 pre-
sents flight results, reference 23 presents the full-scale
wind-tunnel results of the actual HL-10, without the
modified tip fins.
Pyle (ref. 22) made a comparison of the flight-deter-
mined/.JD characteristics of the HL-10 and M2-F2.
Even though the two vehicles had considerably
different configurations, their missions were similar,
and therefore, a comparison of their characteristics is
of interest. The maximum subsonic IJD for the HL-10
was 14 percent higher than the M2-F2. Pyle indicated
that these vehicles had similar lift-curve slopes; the
M2-F2, however, had a much lower AOA at a specific
lift coefficient when compared with the HL-10. The
300-knot approach, for both vehicles, was initiated at a
lift coefficient of approximately 0.15. For the M2-F2
this resulted in an AOA of about -2 ° and for the
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Figure 26. Flight-determined L/D for HL=10.
HL-10, about 10°. At this lift coefficient and these
angles of attack the M2-F2 landing approach was at a
flight path of about -25 ° (nose down), while the HL-10
was at about -8 ° . By comparison the approach angle of
airliners in the 1990s is approximately -3 °. The steep
approaches were never a problem for the pilots,
although they were breathtaking tO watch. The M2-F2
descents were particularly spectacular in their steep-
ness.
At a Mach number of about 0.6, the L/D of the
HL-10 transonic configuration was approximately
26 percent lower than the subsonic configuration. Low-
ering the landing gear decreased the L/D by about
25 percent, which supported the landing technique of
flaring in the clean subsonic configuration and, to an
observer on the ground, seemed to be lowering the
landing gear at the last instant of flight (ref. 5).
The Best Flying of the Lifting Bodies
The HL-10 was indeed a very good flight vehicle.
The modified HL-10 was typically rated as the best
flying of the lifting bodies. On a rating scale from 1 to
10 (1 being the best), the HL-10 was rated a 2 overall.
Typically, each pilot was asked to evaluate various
piloting tasks or maneuvers during each flight. Follow-
ing each flight the pilots were then asked to complete a
questionnaire, which included numerical evaluations
and comments. Of the 419 numerical ratings given, 43
percent were a 2 (ref. 24). Ninety-eight percent of all
pilot ratings were 4 or better. Three percent of all rat-
ings were a 1--the best possible. Only 0.7 percent of
the ratings were a 6, which was the highest (or worst)
rating received by the HL-10. By contrast the M2-F3
was rated overall a 3 (32 percent of all 423 ratings),
with 89 percent of all ratings a 4 or better (ref. 25).
Piloting the HL-10
Test pilots, typically, do not really believe the wind-
tunnel data mechanized in the simulations until they
have flown the actual vehicle. The HL-10 simulation
was no exception. As stated earlier, before the first
flight many of the more experienced engineers indi-
cated that the HL-10 looked "too good" in the simula-
tion and, therefore, thought it to be suspect. Before the
first flight the pilots did not spend much time in the
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simulator.Butfollowingtheneededmodificationsand
thesecondflight,weengineershadnodifficultygetting
pilotsin thesimulatortopreparefor missions.
Aftertheupgrade,designatedmodificationII, pilot-
ingtheHL-10presentednoseriousproblems(ref.26).
Eachpilotfoundit relativelyeasyto fly; thatis,it was
nomoredifficultto fly thananF-1tMmaking a similar
approach. (Typically, the pilots had nothing but praise
for the F-104.) To the uninitiated the unpowered
approach and landing appeared rather sporting. Often
designers and engineers fail to appreciate the advan-
tages of the steep, unpowered approach. The high-
energy approach was felt to be more accurate, safer,
and actually less critical than a low-energy approach.
This type of approach can be related to a dive-bomber
profile. In dive bombing it was known that the steeper
the dive angle, the greater the accuracy. The HL-10
approach task posed basically the same problem: posi-
tion the vehicle on a flightpath or dive angle to inter-
cept a preflare aim point on the ground. The difficulty
of this task was minimized by using a relatively steep
approach (-10 ° to-25°).
The whole approach pattern, then, was just a means
of establishing the vehicle on this flightpath. Because
the approaches were generally well on the front side of
the L/D curve (i.e., at high speeds and relatively low
AOAs below that for maximum LID), there was never
a problem of being short of energy. Energy was modu-
lated to arrive on the desired flightpath either by slow-
ing or accelerating, or remaining at approximately the
same speed and using the speed brakes to alter flight-
path as required. Too much emphasis cannot be made
for requiting speed brakes on this class vehicle. The
brakes can be used much like a throttle to vary the
landing pattern parameters. In addition, the|r weight is
minimal and they require no fuel. To the ground
observer these landings were rather spectacular. The
angles seemed too steep and the speeds too high. But
from the pilot's point of view they was really no prob-
lem. The small landing rockets provided were never
used except for experimental purposes. The speed
brakes were consistently used.
A sequence of photographs illustrates the unpow-
ered approach, touchdown, and final portions of a typi-
cal flight. Figure 27 shows the HL-10 vehicle preparing
Figure 27. HL-10 in terminal approach and landing pattern.
E-21089
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to makea left tum to final approach. In this figure, the
landing runway, nmway 18, is immediately below and
to the tight of the nose of the vehicle. Figure 28 shows
the vehicle on final approach. The railroad tracks, to
the north of Rogers Lake, are to the right and below the
vehicle. In figure 29 the HL-10 is shown in its nose-
high attitude at touchdown on runway 18 and an air-
emerged from the cockpit, as the B-52 launch aircraft
makes a low saluial6ry pass.
Later in the program, many spot landings were
attempted in keeping with the idea that runway
landings would someday be a requirement, i.e., for the
space shuttle (ref. 26). The average miss distance was
determined to be less that 250 ft, with stops within a
borne F-104 chase aircraft just a few feet above the mile.
lakebed in the background. Figure 30 shows the vehi- The higher speed approaches also provided better
cle following landing, soon after the pilot (Mr. Dana) controllability of the vehicle. A conventional approach
Figure 28. HL-10 on final approach.
ECN 2366
ECN 2367
Figure 29. HL-10 on touchdown (F-104 aircraft in background).
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Figure 30. NASA pilot Bill Dana looks on as B-52 flies
over HL-10 following touchdown.
at high power and low speed is much more demanding
upon a pilot. The aircraft is being operated on the back
side of the IdD curve (i.e., at low speeds and relatively
high AOAs above those for maximum L/D), where
engine failure can be catastrophic and vehicle stability,
controllability, and handling qualities are degraded.
The visibility out of the HL-10 was not considered
good by most of the pilots. Even though the pilots were
located far forward, there was no cockpit bulge for the
canopy. The canopy rails, the lower extent of the
canopy, were relatively high, which provided a
sideward field-of-view depression angle of approxi-
mately 16° to the right and somewhat less on the left
because of the canopy defrost duct. The pilots were
supplied a squirt bottle of water in the event the canopy
defrost duct flow was insufficient to clear the fog at
critical portions of flight.
The clear plastic glass nose window provided excel-
lent forward vision for navigation and maneuvering for
touchdown. Unfortunately, this was lenticular in shape
and served as a large demagnifying lens near the
ground. This effect gave the pilots the impression that
they were higher then they really were. On one flight
Mr. Manke reported, "I touctied-down before I wanted
to. Here again the distortion out of that nose window is
still a problem to us, and I think it is always going to
be." Some pilots, on their initial flights, waited until
they were critically close to the ground before they
extended the landing gear. This problem was alleviated
with pilot experience.
Vehicle Dynamics, Control, and Turbulence
Response
As one might imagine, the lifting bodies possessed
some unique aerodynamic characteristics. A most
unusual characteristic is what we call the "dihedral
effect." For a conventional winged airplane the dihe-
dral is the acute angle between the intersecting planes
of the wings (usually measured from a horizontal
plane). In addition, the dihedral effect is an aerody-
namic effect, produced by wing dihedral, which is
related to the tendency of an airplane to fly with wings
level or that effect which produces a rolling tendency
proportional to sideslip angle. Even though lifting bod-
ies do not have wings as such, they possess very large
amounts of dihedral effect. This means that for a little
bit of sideslip, a large amount of rolling tendency is
generated. This was the primary reason that lifting bod-
ies were flown with the pilot having both feet on the
floor (i.e., deliberately keeping their feet off the rudder
pedals). The rudder would induce sideslip and the vehi-
cles would respond primarily in roll.
Each of the lifting bodies experienced flight through
turbulence, which caused pilot anxiety that was out of
proportion to the upsets involved. These upsets
(uncommanded disturbances of unknown origin) were
so different to the pilots that they were frequently
disturbed when encountering any turbulence. Aerody-
namically, the lifting bodies were significantly different
from winged airplanes and one might predict that they
would respond to turbulence differently, but we were
experiencing something new. There was no common
opinion among the pilots as to what particular sensa-
tions triggered the anxieties. The pilots frequently felt
that they were on the verge of an instability and early in
the program felt that the vehicles would "uncork" on
them, Once convinced that no real instability was
present and that the vehicle disturbances were caused
by turbulence, the pilots became accustomed to riding
through the disturbances with little concern. With no
wings on the HL-10, the gust response was consider-
ably different from that for Conventional airplanes.
Conventional airplanes are primarily affected in the
vertical or "seat of the pants" by turbulence. In lifting
bodies, turbulence would produce small amounts of
sideslip disturbance which would result in more of a
high-frequency rolling response and sensation to the
pilots. Th]_ was particularly true at the lower altitudes
where turbulence could be the most severe. Following
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thecrashlanding of the M2-F2 in May 1967 the pilots
were even more sensitized to any upsets near the
ground. The pilots felt that they might be encountering
or on the verge of some sort of dynamic instability
even though the engineers assured them that they were
not.
Mysterious upsets occurred at altitude too. These
upsets frequently occurred during the powered portion
of a profile and they would spook the pilots. The engi-
neers hypothesized that these were instances of wind
shear. To prove the point, on one flight a motion picture
camera was positioned on the ground, directly beneath
the planned ground track. The XL-11 rocket motor
always left a distinctive white exhaust condensation
trail (contrail) no matter what the atmospheric condi-
tions were. Just before launch the camera was turned
on to record the launch and powered portion of the pro-
file along with the pilot's radio transmissions. As the
pilot flew the powered profile he called out the portions
of the profile where the vehicle felt "squirrelly" later-
ally. A playback of the film revealed that the vehicle
had indeed encountered wind shear as revealed by the
disturbed rocket contrail, which correlated with the
time segments of the flight report by the pilots.
With experience the pilots came to accept the fact
that the turbulence r6sponse of the HL-10 was different
from conventional winged airplanes and that they were
not on the threshold of dynamic instability. This was
new ground and they (the pilots) and we (the
engineers) were indeed separating the real from the
imagined.
Training for and Flying Chase for Lifting-
Body Missions
The F-104 aircraft (fig. 31) was clearly the pilots'
choice for both preparation for lifting-body flights and
chasing lifting bodies. This airplane had a high-speed
landing gear and large speed brakes, which enabled it
to duplicate lifting-body L/D characteristics. The
aspect ratio of the F-104 was only about 2.46. The
subsonic clean configuration maximum LID was 5.7.
With the engine at idle, gear down and flaps set for
takeoff, the L/D could be made to simulate each of the
lifting-body configurations by modulation of the speed
brake. Using this technique, the minimum L/D achiev-
able was approximately 2.9. Thus, the F-104 envelope
Bw "t
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Figure 31. Three-view drawing ofF-104 airplane.
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essentially blanketed the LID values for all of the vari-
ous lifting bodies (ref. 27).* In addition, the F-104 air-
plane was reliable and had the pilots' full confidence.
Chasing lifting bodies in the F-104 was not totally
without risk, as experienced by one NASA pilot. While
chasing a lifting-body flight, this pilot inadvertently
entered an uncontrolled spin. The F-104 was not
known as an airplane to spin and successfully recover.
In the later stages of the program an F-104 incident
happened at 35,000 ft altitude and 210 knots airspeed
while maneuvering to join up with the lifting body. The
airplane configuration was gear down, takeoff flaps,
speed brakes out, and idle power. In maneuvering into
position the pilot rolled to 45 ° of bank and sensed the
airplane starting to slice to the right. As this was hap-
pening the airplane was in heavy buffet and the nose
pitched up. An uncontrolled flight condition had been
entered and the airplane was in a spin. One of the other
chase pilots, witnessing the event, radioed a call for
full-forward stick and full-forward trim. The F-104
was now in a flat, uncontrolled spin. The airplane was
rotating to the right at about 40 ° to 50 ° per second and
the pilot could not really believe he had gotten into a
spin. The airplane made four or five full turns. The
rotation was stopped by fiolding full left rudder, neutral
aileron, and full nosedown stick with full nosedown
pitch trim. The recovery seemed to be very abrupt at
approximately 180 knots and 18,000 ft. The engine did
not flame out, and the only configuration change made
during the spin was that the speed brakes were
retracted. The pilot held the nose down until reaching
300 knots and then pulled out at slightly over 4 g of
normal load factor. The bottom of the pullout was at
15,000 ft.
Following this mission the postflight debriefing con-
sisted mostly of the F-104 pilot's experiences of
getting into the spin and, most importantly, his success-
ful recovery. Discussion of the lifting-body mission
that day was relatively trivial by comparison.
The Final Flights
Following flight 35 and the accomplishment of the
major program objectives, the HL-10 was reconfigured
to conduct a two-flight, powered approach and landing
* Note that reference 27 was coauthored by a young NACA/
NASA FRC research pilot by the name of Neil Armstrong, who
later became the first human to walk on the moon.
study. The modification included removing the XLR-11
rocket engine and installing three small hydrogen-per-
oxide rockets. The objective of this study was to look at
shallower glide angles during the final approach. The
rockets were ignited during the approach portion of the
flight profile and reduced the approach angle from
approximately 18° to 6° . The three rockets were ignited
simultaneously and provided a relatively low level of
thrust (approximately 300 lb each) and had the effect of
reducing drag and hence increasing L/D, which permit-
ted a higher glide ratio or shallower glide angle. The
37th and final flight, made on July 17, 1970, with Capt.
Hoag piloting, was the last of the powered approach
flights.
The overall result of this study was largely negative
as compared with unpowered landings. A shallower
powered approach was concluded to provide few of the
benefits that were normally obtained with power. Fur-
ther, it was concluded that even if airbreathing engines
with go-around capability were installed, the normal
approach technique for the space shuttle should be to
operate the vehicle as if it were unpowered and to rely
on the engines only if the approach were greatly in
error. This result was a significant contribution to the
decision not to install landing engines on the space
shuttle (ref. 15).
Table 4 presents a summary of the 37 flights. The
total actual flight time accumulated on the HL-10 was
only 3 hr, 25 min, and 3 sec--not much free-flight
time. Nonetheless, we are reminded that we proved the
concept every time we watch a space shuttle landing.
Pilots Participating in the Program
A total of five pilots (fig. 32) participated in the
HL-10 flight test program; three were NASA pilots and
two were USAF pilots. Mr. Peterson piloted the first
flight, his only one before being injured in an M2-F2
landing accident. Capt. Gentry, the second HL-10 pilot,
made nine flights and later transferred to the X-24A
program. Before participating in the HL-10 program,
Capt. Gentry piloted five M2-F2 flights. Capt. Gentry
piloted the first lifting-body powered flight on
October23, 1968. The remaining NASA pilots were
Mr. Manke, who made 10 flights, and Mr. Dana with
nine flights. Mr. Manke flew his first flight on May 28,
1968, and Mr. Dana's first flight was on April 25, 1969.
The last pilot to fly the HL-10 was Capt. Pete Hoag,
with eight flights.
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Table4. HL-10lifting bodyflightlog.
NO.
Flight
Date number
1 22 Dec 66 H-l-3
2 15 Mar 68 H-2-5
3 3 Apr 68 H-3-6
4 25Apr68 H-4-8
5 3 May 68 H-5-9
6 16 May 68 H-6-10
7 28 May 68 H-7-11
8 11 Jun 68 H-8-12
9 21Jun68 H-9-13
10 24Sep68 H-10-17
Maximum
Maximum Mach/
Pilot altitude, ft mph
Peterson 45,000 0.69/457
Gentry 45,000 0.61/425
Gentry 45,000 0.69/455
Gentry 45,000 0.69/459
Gentry 45,000 0.69/455
Gentry 45,000 0.68/447
Manke 45,000 0.66/434
Manke 45,000 0.64/443
Gentry 45,000 0.64/423
Gentry 45,000 0.68/449
11 3 Oct 68 H-11-18
12 23 Oct 68 H-12-20
Manke 45,000 0.71/471
Gentry 39,700 0.67/449
13 13 Nov 68 H-13-21 Manke 42,650 0.84/524
14 9 Dec 68 H-14-24 Gentry 47,420 0.87/542
15 17 Apr 69 H- 15-27 Manke 52,740 0.99/605
16 25 Apr 69 H-16-28 Dana 45,000 0.70/426
17 9May 69 H-17-29 Manke 53,300 1.13/744
18 20 May 69 H-18-30 Dana
19 28 May 69 H-19-31 Manke
20 6 Jun 69 H-20-32 Hoag
21 19 Jun69 H-21-33 Manke
22 23 Jul 69 H-22-34 Dana
23 6 Aug 69 H-23-35 Manke
24 3 Sep 69 H-24-37 Dana
25 18 Sep69 H-25-39 Manke
26 30Sep69 H-26-40 Hoag
27 27 Oct 69 H-27-41 Dana
28 3 Nov 69 H-28-42 Hoag
29 17 Nov 69 H-29-43 Dana
30 21 Nov 69 H-30-44 Hoag
31 12 Dec 69 H-31-46 Dana
32 19 Jan 70 H-32-47 Hoag
33 26 Jan 70 H-33-48 Dana
34 18 Feb 70 H-34-49 Hoag
35 27 Feb 70 H-35-51 Dana
36 11 Jun 70 H-36-52 Hoag
37 17 Jul 70 H-37-53 Hoag
49,100
62,200
45,000
64,100
63.800
76 100
77.960
79 190
53 750
60 620
64 120
64 590
79,280
79,960
86,660
87,684
67,310
90,303
45,000
45,000
0.90/596
1.24/815
0.67/452
1.40/922
1.27/839
1.54/1020
1.45/958
1.26/833
0.92/609
1.58/1041
1.40/921
1.59/1052
1.43/952
1.31/871
1.31/869
1.35/897
1.86/1228
1.31/870
0.74/503
0.73/499
Flight
time,
sec
187
243
242
258
245
265
245
246
271
245
243
189
385
394
400
252
410
Remarks
First free flight
XLR- 11 rocket motor
installed
First powered flight pre-
mature shutdown
Powered flight, 2 cham-
bers for 186 sec
2 chambers
3 chambers
Glide flight
First supersonic flight 3
chambers
414
398 2 chambers
231 Glide flight
378 2 chambers
373 2 chambers
372 First 4-chamber flight
414 4 chambers
426 4 chambers
436 2 chambers
417
439
408
378
428
410
411
380 Maximum Mach number
416 Maximum altitude
202 Glide landing study
252 Final flight
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Figu_ 32. HL-10projectpilo_(_omlento fight)JerryGentry,PeteHoag,JohnManke,andBill Dana.
THE FUTURE AND LEGACY OF
LIFTING BODIES
Much of the wind-tunnel and flight test work we
accomplished and published was unclassified. As a
result, the Soviet Union took advantage of our work
with their design and flight testing of the subscale
BOR-4 vehicle in 1982.
The HL-10 currently stands proudly as a gate guard-
ian at the entrance of NASA Dryden Flight Research
Center, mounted on a pedestal with a bronze plaque
(fig. 33). In this photograph the yellow ribbon was to
remember and honor the military personnel involved in
the Desert Shield and Desert Storm campaign. With the
flight research of the lifting bodies completed, the
future for theapplication of this technology is as valid
today as it was 25 or 30 years ago, when the data were
obtained.
With today's microprocessor technology and with
this technology integrated into a sophisticated airborne
computer onboard a lifting reentry vehicle, the advan-
tages of lifting reentry can be exploited in ways that wc
4O
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Figure 33. HL-10 as it appeared in February 1991.
Figure 34. Proposed concept of National Aero- _ol_g
Space Plane. Figure 35. NASA Langley proposed HL-20.
could have only wished for. In addition, the advances
in materials and fly-by-wire technology make the
concept even more attractive.
The configuration selected for the National Aero-
Space Plane (NASP) is that of a lifting body (fig. 34).
In addition, NASA Langley is currently working on the
HL-20 lifting body (fig. 35) as a personnel launch sys-
tem in conjunction with the proposed space station.
Reference 28, The Legacy of the Lifting Body, pre-
sents interviews with some of the leading personalities
associated with flight test programs at Edwards AFB.
(Appendix C lists a bibliography for the topic of lifting
bodies.) This article contains the last known interview
with Paul E Bikle before his death on January 19,
1991, and to whom this work gratefully is dedicated.
SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS
AND LESSONS LEARNED
The following lists significant contributions and les-
sons learned by the low-speed HL-10 and lifting-body
programs conducted at the FRC:
• The organizational structure of the HL-10
program allowed decisions to be made at the
technical (engineer) level between NASA and the
contractor_ thus eliminating unneeded manage-
ment and unnecessary paperwork. The result was
a surprisingly low unit cost for the M2-F2 and
HL-10 of only $1.2 million.
41
• The hybrid simulationof flight by interfacing
analogcomputerswith high-speedigitalcom-
puters to generatecomplex nonlinearaero-
dynamicfunctionswasdemonstrated.
• Thefirst all-digitalreal-timesimulationat FRC
wasaccomplishedby movingtheequations-of-
motion integrationsonto a high-speedigital
computer.
• Thefirstpoweredlifting-bodyflightwasmadeon
November13,1968.
• Thefirst supersoniclifting-bodyflightwasmade
onMay9, 1969.
• ThemaximumMachnumber(1.86)achievedby
any lifting body wasreachedon February18,
1970.
• Themaximumaltitude(90,303ft) reachedbyany
liftingbodywasreachedonFebruary27,1970.
• Along with the other lifting bodiesin the
program,the HL-10 demonstratedthat piloted
reentryvehiclescanexecutesteep,high-energy
landingapproachesthatarepartof an accurate
andsafeoperationaltechnique.
• The HL-10 assistedin demonstratingthe
importanceand inherentreliability of speed
brakesforunpoweredreentryvehicles.
• The programdemonstratedthat lifting bodies
equippedwithspeedbrakescanfly steep,high-
energyapproachesandcanspot landwith an
averagemissdistanceoflessthan250ft.
• A classof vehiclewithveryhighdihedraleffect,
acharacteristicof lifting bodies,wasshowntofly
safely.
• The program demonstratedthat atmospheric
turbulenceresponsewasin theroll axis(dueto
thehighdihedraleffectof lifting bodies)rather
thanpitchaxisand that this was not an apparent
impending instability.
• Powered landings using shallower approaches
were demonstrated to provide fewer benefits as
compared with the steeper unpowered landing
technique.
• The M2-F1 demonstrated that a pilot could fly
and land a lifting-body shaped vehicle.
• The short total flight time and low costs of the
HL-10 and M2-F2 programs were sufficient to
provide confidence and knowledge upon which to
make very crucial decisions pertaining to the
space shuttle orbital entry landing concept.
• The effectiveness and versatility of the B-52
launch concept was demonstrated conclusively.
This system remains a valuable national resource.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The development, design, fabrication, and flight
testing of the HL-10 was a significant effort accom-
plished by a team of NASA and contractor employees.
Significant efforts and contributions by many individu-
als within NASA Langley, NASA Dryden, and the
Northrop Corp. made the program a success. This story
of the HL-10, as told here, is but a small part of what
really happened. The rest is only contained in the living
memory of those who have since retired. We wish that
we could have included the comments of everyone
involved in the program. It was and always will be the
people who make programs work.
In 1970 one of Dryden's premiere test pilots, Milton
O. Thompson, said, "We have been convinced of the
feasibility of a lifting entry, horizontal landing space-
craft since we flew the M2-F1 seven years ago .... On
the basis of our own experience, we cannot discuss the
practicality of the proposed launch, boost, and orbit
operations, nor can we assess the status of required
technology in such critical areas as materials, struc-
tures and thermal protection systems .... If all the
other NASA Centers, in conjunction with the Depart-
ment of Defense and industry, can get the [space] shut-
fie off the ground, into orbit, and insure that it survives
the entry, we at the Flight Research Center can guaran-
tee that it can be flown to the destination and landed
safely?' As we all have seen, this statement has become
reality.
Dryden Flight Research Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Edwards, California, August 10, 1993
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APPENDIX A
Glossary
Ambient pressure
Angle of attack
Angle of sideslip
Ballistic trajectory
Camber
Coefficients
The pressure in the surrounding
environment about a flying air-
plane but undisturbed or unaf-
fected by it.
The angle between a reference
line fixed with respect to an air-
frame (body) and the velocity
vector.
The angle between the vertical
reference plane through the cen-
terline of an airframe (body) and
the velocity vector.
The path followed by a body
being acted upon only by gravita-
tional forces and the resistance of
the medium through which it
passes.
The rise or curvature in the mean
line (mean between upper and
lower surface) curve of an airfoil
or airfoil section from its chord
line from leading edge to trailing
edge. Upper camber refers to the
upper surface of an airfoil and
lower camber to the lower sur-
face.
In aerospace engineering (and
engineering in general) it is com-
mon practice to express dimen-
sionless coefficients of various
measured quantities. Coeffi-
cients are numbers obtained in
experiments under certain speci-
fied conditions that can be used
to relate subscale (wind-tunnel)
measurements to full-scale
(flight) measurements at similar
conditions or expressed as a
ratio.
Dihedral
Dihedral effect
Directional stability
?
Elevon
Fixed-base
Flare
Flight cards
Hypersonic
The dihedral is the upward or
downward inclination of the
wings from the root to the tip
showing a V (or inverted V)
shape from a front or rear view.
Downward is sometimes referred
to as anhedral.
Dihedral effect is an aerody-
namic effect, associated with the
wing dihedral, which is the roil-
ing tendency of an airplane due
to sideslip.
The property of an aircraft
enabling it to restore itself from a
sideslip condition. Also called
weathercock stability as in a
weathervane.
A control surface on the trailing
edge of an airfoil that serves as
elevator (pitch control) and aile-
ron (roll control) on an aircraft
without a horizontal tail.
This pertains to a simulator that
has no moving cockpit platform.
That portion of a flight profile,
just before touchdown, when the
rate of sink is arrested so that a
smooth landing is accomplished.
The printed version of the entire
chronological sequence of
maneuvers, significant pilot
activities, and events for a flight
profile recorded on 3×5-in. flip
cards for ease of pilot viewing.
These also contain alternate pro-
files, emergency procedures, etc.
Pertaining to speeds of Mach 5
and above.
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L/D curve
Limit cycle
Low key
Mach number
Notch filter
When LID is plotted as a function
of AOA, an increasing value for
LID is realized with increasing
AOA until some maximum is
reached and a further increase in
AOA results in decreasing values
of LID. The front side, at rela-
tively low AOA, means that as
AOA is increased, the L/D also
increases, while on the back side
the reverse is true.
A condition in a feedback control
system that produces an uncon-
trollable oscillation of limited
amplitude of a flight control sur-
face due to closed-loop phase lag
resulting from excessive hystere-
sis, accumulated free-play of
mechanical linkages, and power
actuator nonlinearities.
A time point within the flight
profile when the pilots devote
their attention to making the
landing approach.
Ratio of reference speed to the
speed of sound in the free air
about an aircraft or missile.
Named in honor of Ernst Mach
(approximately 1887) who
proved that important flow varia-
tions were not a function of the
stream velocity but of the ratio of
the stream velocity to the speed
of sound in the stream.
An electronic filter with a signal
input/output that filters a certain
specified, relatively small, fre-
quency band (on the input) that if
allowed to remain (on the output)
would produce an undesirable
response in vehicle dynamics
through the flight control system.
Pitch gain
Reynolds number
Shock wave
Trajectory
Unit stick
Upsets
Washout filter
Visual display
A flight control pitch angular rate
feedback signal quantitative set-
ting. In the HL-10 this was pilot
selectable.
A nondimensional parameter
representing the ratio of the
momentum forces to the viscous
forces in fluid flow. Named after
Osborne Reynolds (1842-1912).
A surface or sheet of discontinu-
ity set up in a supersonic field of
flow, through which the fluid
undergoes a finite decrease in
velocity accompanied by a
marked increase in pressure, den-
sity, temperature, etc.
The path traced by any body
moving as a result of an exter-
naUy applied force, considered in
three dimensions.
One inch of stick deflection.
(In this paper) HL-10 distur-
bances or vehicle motions that
were not a result of pilot com-
mand inputs, but were caused by
some external source.
An electronic filter with a signal
input/output that filters specified
low frequencies or frequencies
approaching zero in a flight con-
trol system to eliminate
unwanted control surface com-
mands due to signal feedback.
This pertains to a simulation that
presents a simulated visual scene
to the occupants of an engineer-
ing or flight training simulator.
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APPENDIX B
The HL-10 Lifting-Body Team
Many of the people on this list participated in more
than one of the lifting-body programs as well as other
major NASA and USAF programs. This list may not be
complete. Those unnamed individuals contributed to
the success of the HL-10 program too. (Figure 16 is a
group photograph of 18 of the HL-10 project person-
nel.)
Paul E Bikle
R. Dale Reed
John McTigue
Garrison E "Garry" Layton
Bruce A. Peterson
Capt. Jerry Gentry, USAF
William H. "Bill" Dana
John Manke
Capt. Pete Hoag, USAF
Meryl DeGeer
Herb Anderson
George Sitterle
Andrew "Jack" Cates
Berwin Kock
Weneth D. Painter
Robert W. Kempel
Larry Strutz
Don Bacon
Lowell Greenfield
Flight Research Center
Director
Lifting-Body Program
Manager
Lifting-Body Program
Manager
Project Manager
Project Pilot
Project Pilot
Project Pilot
Project Pilot
Project Pilot
Operations Engineer
Operations Engineer
Operations Systems
Engineer
Operations Systems
Engineer
Systems Engineer
Systems Engineer
Stability and Controls
Engineer
Stability and Controls
Engineer
Simulation Engineer
Simulation Engineer
Larry Caw
Georgene Laub
Jon Pyle
William D. Clifton
Capt. John M. Rampy, USAF
Fred_ R. Erb
R. C. Hakes
Charles W. Russell
Art Anderson
John W. "Bill" Lovett
William "Bill" Mersereau
Richard L. Blair
Albert B. "AI" Harris
Bill Link
John Reeves
Bertha Ryan
Alex "Skip" Sim
2d Lt. Pat Haney, USA
2d Lt. Jerry Shimp, USA
Simulation Engineer
Aerodynamist
Performance Engineer
(Lift and Drag)
Instrumentation
Engineer
Flight Controls/
Simulation Engineer
Northrop Norair,
Systems and
Mechanial Design
Engineering Superv-
sor
Northrop Norair,
M-2/HL-10 Project
Director
Crew Chief
Mechanic
Mechanic
Mechanic
Instrumentation
Technician
Electrical Technician
Inspector
Inspector
M2-F1/F2 Stability and
Control Engineer
Cooperative Student
(Engineering)
Data Processing
Officer
Data Processing
Officer
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